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Contesting Europeanism: Migrant Solidarity Activism in the European Union 
 
 
 
Celine Cantat 
 
 
 
 
Abstract; In this paper, I investigate the way in which legal frameworks concerning immigration 
and border controls have been transnationalised in the European Union (EU) and how migrant 
solidarity activists in EU member states have responded to this development. Taking the 
Eurozone crisis as a starting point, I first develop a critical analysis of the EU project as the 
regional expression of a set of economic and political developments generally referred to as 
‘neoliberal globalisation’. In this context, I propose to look at the dominant contemporary notion 
of European belonging as a legitimising discourse aimed at stabilising the particular social and 
political organisation of the region that the EU has established. I argue that bordering, borders 
and exclusion have been essential to the form of European identity that the EU has put forward. 
The Europeanisation of immigration law and border controls is presented as the material 
embodiment of this dominant notion of European identity. I then present my fieldwork, which 
consisted in interviews and participant observation with migrant solidarity groups and networks 
in three EU member states. One of the main focuses of the fieldwork was to investigate the ways 
in which migration-related activists and organisations have adapted their work in order to 
respond to the developments at the EU level. I present an analysis of my fieldwork data drawing 
on insights from social movement theory. In conclusion, I identify a process of pan-
Europeanisation of migrant solidarity struggles and critically assess its resemblance to an 
emerging transnational social movement. 
 
 
 
Key words: Europe, European identity, European Union, migration, activism, transnationalisation, 
social movement. 
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Since 2009 and the advent of the ‘Eurozone crisis’, the subject of ‘Europe’ and disputes over the 
required course of action to save the region have been regular features of the media and public 
debate. Yet, beyond the on-going controversy concerning the best ways to implement austerity 
measures and occasional high-level dramas in Brussels, the crucial questions of what the 
European Union (EU) represents, which power dynamics it enacts and what its relationship with 
the peoples of its member states is remain as vague and unclear as ever. Last April, the Spring 
2013 Eurobarometer showed the lowest ever levels of popular confidence toward the EU in the 
six biggest European member states.1 A polling system aimed at measuring popular feelings 
toward the EU, the Eurobarometer, was created in 1973 as Eurocrats and pro-Europe politicians 
were showing increasing concern regarding the growing popular discontent with the European 
project. Notions such as that of ‘European democratic deficit’ were gaining currency to describe 
the tenuous relationship between the then-European Community (EC) and the people of its 
member countries (Chalmer et al. 2006: 64). In a desperate quest for legitimacy, a series of 
measures were designed in Brussels in order to instigate a sense of European belonging or 
‘Europeanism’ among the people of the region. In the absence of meaningful emblems of 
identification with the institutions of the European Community, a major identity-building 
enterprise, largely based on the reproduction of a series of national identity symbols at the 
supranational level, was put in place. Thus, a European anthem was adopted in 1972, followed by 
a European flag in 1983.2  
In this paper, I will first look at how the process of creation of a particular sense of 
European identity and belonging has been put at the service of the European Union project. I 
will argue that the produced notion of Europeanism has mainly relied on identifying and 
excluding the non-European and on drawing borders between Europe and outside. The 
harmonisation of migration and asylum law across the EU will be analysed as the legal 
embodiment of this development. In the second part, I will look at how these forms of 
restriction and exclusion have been challenged. I will present and discuss the fieldwork research I 
carried out with groups and organisations working with migrants in the EU and investigate 
whether and how, in the process of opposing the EU exclusionary framework on migration and 
asylum, new transnational links have developed between these actors, leading to alternative forms 
of European solidarity.  
 
 
The Politics of ‘Europeanism’ 
 
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the growing dissatisfaction and disengagement towards the 
European project occurred as the EC was endorsing a distinctively neoliberal turn, in line with 
the economic orthodoxy of the time. The project of an integrated capitalist market in Europe in 
fact predated the European Community, but concrete steps in this direction had been hampered 
by the persistence of national capitalist interests. It is in the 1970s and 80s that the prerogatives 
of the new neoliberal form of global capitalism pushed national capitals into transnational 
alliances, leading to the 1986 Single European Act which placed firmly on the regional agenda the 
idea of a liberalised European market. This integrated market was to bring back economic growth 
to a Europe slowed down by ‘incrusted and rigid structures of European labour and social 
regulations’ (van Apeldoorn 2001). In practice, history has now shown that this meant the 
 
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/24/trust-eu-falls-record-low  
2 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/index_en.htm  
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opening up of European economies to ‘competitors’, twinned with the dismantlement of national 
systems of social protection and welfare. Today, as the failures of the global capitalist agenda 
have become more striking than ever, the neoliberal nature of the European Union remains one 
of the main focuses of popular protests in Europe. From Greece to Portugal, from the UK to 
Spain, the last three years have seen waves of demonstrations and popular anger denouncing the 
capitalist EU and the dictatorship of the ‘Troika’ (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund).3  
In this context of on-going volatility, the afore-mentioned attempts to conjure a sense of 
European belonging must be seen as part of a vital struggle for meaning on the part of the EU, 
which I call the ‘politics of Europeanism’. As Fran Cetti (2010) puts it ‘the survival of locally or 
regionally based capitals in an internationally hybrid world of instability, regional conflicts and 
economic convulsions demands … an inherently ideological operation to postulate a unitary set 
of interests in the attempt to displace social antagonisms and secure legitimacy’. One of its 
crudest mechanisms has been the production a set of identity symbols at the European level 
reminiscent of the traditional appendages of national identities. Less immediately obvious, the 
attempt to inculcate a sense of Europeanism in the inhabitants of the region has also relied on 
the multiplication of narratives tracing back the roots of the Union to ancient times, drawing on 
European past to present the EU as the linear continuation of a European historical and cultural 
spirit in motion. The idea of a continuous Europe as an entity and as an identity is not a new one. 
Since the 1970s, it has been increasingly asserted as a possible antidote to the unconvincing reality 
of the European Community/Union. A crude example is Jordan’s assertion that ‘Europe is a 
culture which occupies a cultural area’ (Jordan 1973 in Paasi 2001). But one can also note, 
particularly since 1989, a sharp increase in a ‘culture-historical literature on the question of 
Europe’ (Nowotny 2000). Nowotny examines the work of a range of European historians and 
intellectuals, specialised in an array of research areas, and highlights their tendency to concentrate 
on topics concerned with tracing a historical sense of European identity.  He claims that: 
 
From the medievalist Jacques Le Goff to Rémi Brague, professor of Arabic philosophy, 
the "postmodern" conservative Peter Koslowski and the left-wing liberal Massimo 
Cacciari, this literature shares a specific interest in a historiologically decipherable 
"identity", as well as in culture-historical prototypes of Europe which are supposed to 
allow conclusions – or rather preconceived judgements – on the future shape of the EU 
(ibid, own translation) 
 
A common trait of these researches is that a set of historical events and ideas are drawn upon to 
create a coherent narrative of the construction of Europe as one entity. They also sanctify 
Europe, upholding it as a desirable model with universal validity. In his account of Europe since 
1945, Tony Judt (2005) praises ‘Europe’s emergence in the dawn of the 21st century as a paragon 
of the international virtues: a community of values … held up by Europeans and non-Europeans 
alike as an exemplar for all to emulate’. In the UK, no group expressed better the mythology of 
Europeanism than New Labour. In Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century, Mark Leonard (2005) 
invites his readers to share his dream: ‘Imagine a world of peace, prosperity and democracy… 
What I am asking you to imagine is the ‘New European Century’…’ (in Anderson 2011: 47).  
 
 
 
3 See this useful press review in French of articles against the Troika: http://actu-leplus.nouvelobs.com/troika-
commission-europeenne-banque-centrale-europeenne-fmi.html 
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The Imagined Community of the EU: ‘Fortress Europe’  
 
In contrast with such essentialist narratives, a number of scholars have elaborated critical 
reflections on these attempts to form a European identity. Gerard Delanty (1995) claims that 
defining Europe has always relied on representations of what it is not and been characterised by 
the lack of European unity besides that achieved through adversity. He demonstrates that lines of 
exclusion/inclusion have always been at the heart of projects related to the idea of Europe and 
that Europe’s cultural and political identity has historically been articulated through a process of 
constant re-construction of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ reflecting particular sets of power relations at given 
points in time. Ideas of Europe have been characterised by their production of an excluded 
otherness, in both geographical and ‘mythological’ terms, which evolves in content throughout 
time (different ‘Others’ are mobilised towards the elaboration of different projects) but remains 
constant as a mechanism. His conclusion is that these dynamics of exclusion are more than ever 
at work in the EU project: ‘who is a European is largely a matter of exclusion, and in the 
dichotomy of self and other which constitutes the discourse of European identity, Europeanness 
is constructed in opposition with the non-European, in particular Islam. This sense of the 
uniqueness of the European is today emerging as a basis for a kind of supranational identity and 
citizenship which European integration does not have’ (Delanty 1995: 9).  
In a similar vein, Marfleet (1999, 2002) examines the role played by Huntington’s theory 
of a ‘clash of civilisations’ in the EU’s attempt to construct a European identity. The clash theory 
relies on primordialist readings of history and of the world, which is seen as divided in hermetic 
areas of ‘culture’. Those belonging to other ‘civilisations’ are erected as absolute Others and it is 
in the mirror of this produced image of otherness that Eurocrats have tried to anchor an ever-
fleeting sense of a European identity. These observations are confirmed by the work of Liz 
Fekete. Looking at recent socio-political developments, Fekete (2001, 2009) examines the rise of 
‘xeno-racism’ in Europe, ‘a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the 
former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the 
uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe's doors, the Europe that helped to displace them 
in the first place' (Sivanandan in Fekete 2001, 2009). Fekete provides evidence of the intrinsic 
relation that links, on the one hand, the media, legal, discursive and physical practices of xeno-
racism in Europe and. on the other hand, the strengthening of a shared sense of European 
belonging and identity as a basis for European citizenship. In doing so, she demonstrates the 
importance and instrumentality of the (produced) figure of the non-European, the migrant, as a 
crucial ideological cog in the European discourse on identity and belonging.  
Together with these authors, I argue that in spite of its claims to represent a supra- or 
post-national political entity freed from the exclusionary tendencies of the national form, the 
process of production of a European identity has relied on similarly restrictive mechanisms. In 
order to trigger a sense of allegiance within the population of its member states, the EU has 
resorted to the figure of the foreign Other, traditionally mobilised in national identity building 
enterprises, as an ideological counterpoint against which what qualifies as European can be 
defined. This Other has been revamped to fulfil the need of the large regional project and has 
been granted alleged civilisational and cultural features. The idea of the ‘migrant’, sanctified in 
European legislation as the ‘third country national’, has been of utmost importance in the 
construction of European self and otherness.4 The migrant as a constructed figure, who comes 
from outside yet infiltrates the inside, also allows the articulation of two processes of identity 
 
4 It is also important to remember that the EU project does not only erect external borders of absolute otherness but 
also creates internal borders. The use of the derogatory acronym PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) to refer to  
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formation, that of the production of difference and that of the dialectics of the same. The 
importance of such figures in the construction of national identities has already been the subject 
of extensive scholarly attention. Balibar (1996), for example, has offered detailed historical and 
sociological analyses of the role of the border as the place where both difference and sameness 
are produced and has shown that the ‘border is central’ to identity formation in nation-states. 
What is striking in the case of the EU, is the reproduction of similar mechanisms at the 
supranational level. 
The centrality of the border to the EU identity building process is also visible in another 
way. One of the key material embodiments of the European unity and identity that Eurocrats 
have been trying to produce is the suppression of national border controls between member-
states, making it possible for EU citizens to travel across the EU without a passport and visa. 
This free travel zone, named the Schengen Area after the Treaty that created it, currently 
comprises the territories of 25 European countries, including three non-EU member-states 
(Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). Only two of the EU member-states, Ireland and the UK, 
have decided to opt out of Schengen (though the Treaty has been integrated into EU law) and 
three EU member-states (Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania) have not yet implemented it, mostly 
due to restrictions towards the freedom of movement of their citizens imposed by other EU 
countries. The abolition of intra-EU national borders through Schengen has been heralded as the 
ultimate illustration of the progressive potential of the Union. However, a closer examination of 
the EU today reveals a very different picture that contradicts the idea that European nations and 
nationalisms are being replaced with progressive cosmopolitan forces. Schengen operates as a 
single state for international travel and has therefore matched the elimination of internal borders 
with a reinforcement of Europe’s external borders (those with non-EU member-states) so 
ruthless that the term ‘Fortress Europe’ has been coined to describe this process. Only those 
holding EU citizenship – which is derivative in that it can only be acquired through citizenship of 
one of the member states – can benefit from the privileges of Schengen and of freedom of 
movement within the Area. For others, not citizens of a EU member-state, the exclusion from 
national communities is now exacerbated by an exclusion from the community of Europeans. 
The institutions and rules of the Schengen framework thus materially call into existence and 
embody the idea according to which Europeans share a common identity, setting them aside 
from non-European. In this regard, I argue that rather than making nationalism obsolete, EU 
integration is actually crafting a form of hyper-nationalism with similar exclusionary tendencies. 
European identity is thus created at its external and internal borders – in its regime of visa and 
residence permits, in its retention centres, in its discriminatory policies against migrants within 
member states. Haynes puts it very clearly: 
 
it is here, in both the ideas and practice of immigration control, perpetuated both at the 
intergovernmental level and at the level of the EU, that the new ‘Europe’ is being forged, 
as much as in the debates and celebrations of internal unity (Haynes in Dale & Cole 1999: 
25).  
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Contesting the EU Border Regime 
 
In this context, it is now possible to see why groups and movements contesting EU border 
controls and immigration policies engage with issues at the heart of the European project, 
unsettling one the key mechanisms used to justify and stabilise its existence. Between November 
2011 and November 2012, as part of my fieldwork, I conducted interviews with activists engaged 
in migrant solidarity work in three EU countries, namely France, Italy and the UK, and tried to 
grasp the ways in which their activities challenged and destabilised the dominant European 
discourse. Groups working in solidarity with migrants in Europe are varied and plentiful: they 
range from Brussels-based organisations engaged in policy work and lobbying of EU institutions 
to research groups concerned with documenting and reporting on imprisonment practices in 
detention centres, to numerous community or activists groups providing day-to-day practical 
support to migrants. Before starting my fieldwork per se, I therefore took a while filtering these 
groups in order to select the type of practices and discourses I would be focusing on. My main 
criterion was that activist practices that would constitute my case studies had to conduct migrant 
solidarity work at the European level, rather than solely in local or national contexts. Through 
this pre-research process, I identified 11 groups and campaigns in the three above-mentioned 
countries. I then conducted 21 in-depth interviews, lasting an average of two hours, with 
representatives (members, staff or volunteers) from these groups and networks. In spite of the 
common objective of their activities, my participants display a high level of heterogeneity, with 
groups ranging from established charities with paid staff to loose activist networks with little 
formal structures. Three groups are France-based associations5 (Gisti, Fasti and Migreurop) whilst 
one, the Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN), is a UK-registered charity. No Borders, No One Is 
Illegal (NOII) and Stop Deportation are unregistered activist networks. Finally, PICUM is a 
Brussels-based NGO and European Alternatives calls itself a ‘transnational membership 
organisation’ that brings together local groups. These groups and networks greatly vary in terms 
of yearly income or budget, membership requirements and structures of participation. One of the 
main focuses of my research is the way in which these diverse organisations and networks 
develop transnational links in order to engage in European migrant solidarity work. I am also 
interested in investigating whether any form of grassroots alternative European identity linking 
activists across national borders has been emerging. I will however not be addressing this point in 
this paper. 
In order to meaningfully investigate and study activist practices and examine whether and 
how a process of transnationalisation is taking place, I have used some selected tools and 
concepts developed by Social Movement Theory (SMT) scholars, particularly New Social 
Movement (NSM) theory. The main appeal of SMT was its flexibility, which allowed me to look 
at a wide range of discourses and praxes, varying in shape, method and location, whilst retaining a 
comparative dimension by conceptualising them as forming a continuum – linked by the 
commonality of their aims – rather than as isolated sites of action – characterised by the 
specificity of their approach. NSM theory, a branch of SMT, focuses on the new organisational 
forms developed by contemporary movements, often characterised by decentralised, 
polycephalous and reticulated structures (Freeman 1983: 204). NSM theory focuses on the way 
politicised actors organise in loose coalitions to promote the particular discourse and objectives 
 
5 Under French law, an association ‘is the agreement through which two or more people decide putting in common, 
in a permanent fashion, their knowledge and/or activities for an objective which is not profit-oriented’ (own 
translation from French law on association from 1901). 
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of a social movement but do so in less formalised ways than traditional organisations (Buechler 
1990: 61). This has been of high relevance to the study of a variety of movements that emerged 
since the 1970s (Wiktorowicz 2004a: 12) such as women’s movements (Buechler 1990; 
Staggenborg 1998), lesbian feminists (Taylor and Whittier 1992) and neighbourhood movements 
(Stoecker 1995). NSM theory is particularly adapted to the study of the nascent yet uneven 
network of varied initiatives that I have come across in the field of European migrant solidarity 
activism. The main conceptual tools developed within SMT and NSM theory that I refer to are 
the following: 
 
Opportunities and Constraints: the notions of ‘opportunities’ and ‘constraints’ in relation to 
social movements emerge from the recognition that social movements do not operate in a 
vacuum but rather exist in social contexts characterised by complex configurations of possibilities 
and limitations, which play a part in structuring a movement’s dynamics (Wiktorowicz 2004a: 13). 
Exogenous factors can be both a source of further empowerment or a source of constraint for 
activists participating in social movement politics (Tarrow 1998; Kolb 2007: 52). These 
exogenous factors influence a movement and its choice of tactics and actions, as well as the 
degree of public exposure and visibility it achieves. Generally speaking, these concepts are used to 
describe the level of (formal and informal) access to political institutions and decision-making 
structures; the degree of popularity of the movement’s claims and objectives within the wider 
public; the type of political system the movement operates within and the level of political 
repression it can be exposed to. Often referred to as  ‘political opportunities and constraints’, it is 
worth noting that they also consist of cultural, social and economic factors (Kurzman 1996; Mc 
Adam & al. 2001). Thinking in terms of opportunities and constraints is extremely relevant to 
understand the different ways in which the groups and networks participating in my fieldwork 
organise their campaigns and protests. Factors such as whether groups are acting on their 
national stage or engaging with the European level will determine their chosen methods of 
action. Moreover, a restrictive context in terms of opportunities will often lead groups and 
campaigns to seek new alliances in order to gain more leverage. The question of the 
transnationalisation of pro-migrant initiatives in the EU must thus partly be analysed in relation 
to this mechanism. 
 
Frames: the concept of framing emerges from the observation that ideology is not the sole 
guiding reference for discourse and action. Rather than referring to ideology as the only 
explanatory factor of the way in which people understand their political identities and discourses, 
it is more insightful to understand the role of ideas as socially created, organised and 
disseminated variables (Wiktorowicz 2004a: 15; Oliver and Johnston 2001). The process of 
discourse-creation and construction results in what SMT sometimes calls ‘packages’, which refers 
to the way in which movements frame their arguments by articulating various references and 
ideological resources in response to a problem (Wiktorowicz: 9). One must also remember than 
social movements exist and develop in social, political and cultural fields where multiple actors 
with various agendas and perspectives are competing over ‘framing hegemony’, which means 
they engage in contests to influence the way in which a particular issue or set of issues is 
interpreted and understood (Benford 1993). This is clearly the case of the relationship between a 
movement and the dominant frame it opposes, but contests over framing also happen within 
movements between activists holding different positions (e.g. violence vs. non-violence, 
pragmatism vs. ideologism, engagement vs. non engagement with the authorities, and so on). A 
social movement can be seen as an attempt at disputing the ‘official frame(s)’ in a context where 
mainstream discourses will attempt to limit the institutional resources and the public spaces 
available for the spreading of alternative frames (Noakes 2000; Wiktorowicz 2004a). Selbin (2010) 
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insists on the ‘power of story’, that is to say, the importance of developing a frame of analysis of 
both domination and reaction that successfully compels people to act on their indignation. The 
narratives that activists develop are characterised by ‘associations and connections across time 
and space that people deploy to construct a revolutionary imaginary comprising symbols, names, 
dates, places, grievances, stories, and means and methods, which they then draw on as they 
consider the world and their options’ (ibid: 166). In this sense, frames are crucial interpretative 
devices that operate as translators of grievances and perceived opportunities into the mobilisation 
of activists and resources toward achieving a movement’s goals. The issue of framing is central to 
the work of pro-migrant groups and campaigns I am working with. Not only do these 
organisations have the stated aim to challenge dominant frameworks on migration, I argue that 
they also engage in a work of ‘reframing Europe’ which relies among other mechanisms on 
presenting a different ‘story’ of what Europe represents in the world and in history. 
 
Repertoires: the concept of the ‘repertoire’ (often discussed as ‘repertoire of contentious’ or 
‘cultural repertoire’) of a social movement refers to the set of protest-related tools and tactics 
available to it in a particular context. Commonly used tactics, actions and tools that feature 
frequently in social movements’ repertoires include public meetings, demonstrations and rallies, 
vigils and sit-ins, petitions and lobbying of governmental institutions, press releases and media 
statements, strikes and pickets, boycotts, among others. Repertoires evolve over time, in response 
to the opportunities and constraints and to the framing strategies chosen by a particular social 
movement (Tarrow 1998). New tactics are integrated into repertoires all the time, as illustrated by 
the recent scholarship around Internet-based tactics and ‘hacktivism’ (Samuel 2004; Knapp 2005). 
My fieldwork will look in particular at how groups develop and selectively use several repertoires, 
each adapted to a particular level or type of action, and how, in the process of collaborating with 
other groups, these repertoires often evolve and sometimes converge. 
 
 
The Changing Context of Migrant Solidarity Practices 
 
Solidarity campaigns and groups opposing and denouncing the way in which migrants are treated 
are by no means new. They have featured in Western European countries’ political and social life 
in various forms since the emergence of immigration controls and the importation of migrant 
workers for industrial purposes as early as the late 18th and early 19th centuries.6 However, I would 
argue that while solidarity movements opposing racism, immigration controls and discrimination 
against migrants have been important aspects of the European political scene for decades, the 
groups and movements I am looking at in my research present some qualitative differences with 
previous forms of migrant solidarity. The groups created recently specifically to address issues 
engendered by the Europeanisation of migration frameworks and those that existed before but 
have both been pushed into engaging with European issues have been shaped by the new 
 
6 In his book, No One Is Illegal: Immigration Control and Asylum, Steve Cohen, one of NOII’s founding members, 
provides a historical overview of such movements and groups in the UK. In a similar vein, in Open Borders: The Case 
Against Immigration Controls, Teresa Hayter traces the origins of pro-migrant campaigning in the UK and explores the 
emergence of an explicitly anti-fascist and anti-racist dimension to migration struggles in the 1970s (Hayter 2004). 
Similar developments can be identified in other European countries, including France, though they vary in form and 
content. The Italian context, like that of other southern European countries such as Spain and Portugal, is 
significantly different in that, until the 1970s, Italy was mostly a source of emigration rather than a destination of 
immigration. As Italy increasingly became a destination of immigration, the Italian anti-racist movement emerged 
throughout the 1980s and held its first significant protest rally in 1989. 
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political and social context of migration in Europe. Here, I would like to mention three recent 
developments that have affected the political identities of pro-migrant groups and activists.  
First, there has been an irruption of migrant-led struggles, which have brought a new 
migrant subjectivity into the political discourse associated with migration. The intervention of 
migrant-led initiatives in the political space of European societies is a relatively new phenomenon 
that has nonetheless deeply affected the ways in which pro-migrant groups operate and 
conceptualise their work. Though the relationship of the organisations and groups I have 
interviewed with migrant-led groups varies, the conceptual recognition of a subjectivity and 
agency of migrants, as a diverse and heterogeneous group, is unanimously asserted.  
 
Since the 1990s, we have much more organic links with organised groups of migrants. 
This is not because we didn't work directly with migrants before, but… there were few 
self-organised groups… This has changed, we have partners and that means our work has 
to be always grounded on the daily reality of the lives of sans papiers. This was a very 
positive development.7 
 
The way in which migrants are objectified by mainstream representations speaking of ‘flows’, 
statistics and numbers whose presence results from ‘push and pull’ factors, is also denounced and 
challenged (Walter 2003). A participant from Italy spoke of eight ways in which the mainstream 
media’s language around migration was flawed: 
 
There are eight rules media follow to speak of immigration. I will tell you about them 
now (…) First, the use of shocking news: statements not corroborated by evidences. The 
phenomenon of irregular migrations is represented as a phenomenon of frightening 
proportions (…) Second, the use of a terminology that involves contempt, that 
dehumanises, that deprives of dignity (…) Third, the use of words with negative 
connotations (…) Fourth, the abusive use of a military terminology like, for instance, 
emergency, alarm, siege, invasion, landing. The message reaching the public opinion is 
that Italy is at ‘war’ and that migrants are ‘the enemy’. Fifth, Italian media interpret the 
migratory phenomenon through the opinion of politicians. But migrations are a complex 
phenomenon requiring experts able to ‘explain’ it. Sixth, a biased selection of people 
participating in the debates (…) Then, the use of words denoting something abnormal or 
extraordinary. For instance: biblical exodus, humanitarian tsunami, earthquake, human 
weapons. Finally, there is a total lack of care and knowledge about the situation in the 
countries of origin of migrants. This calls into question specific political and historical 
responsibilities of Italy towards countries such as Libya, Somalia, Eritrea (…) which have 
a colonial past with Italy.8 
 
This evolution has much to do with the irruption of migrant-led struggles on the national and 
European scenes, where non-citizens affirm their subjecthood and claim their ‘right to have 
rights’, even when and where the space for them to do so has to be claimed by force. The French 
sans-papier movement of the 1990s is a well-known example of this. A large part of the 
scholarship on the sans-papiers focused on the emergence of a new political subjectivity of non-
 
7 Interview with Gisti’s Claire Rodier (Paris, September 2012) 
8 Interview with When We Don’t Exist’s Roberto Noury (Lampedusa, July 2012). 
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citizens and the disruption of the traditional understanding of democracy, civil rights, and 
citizenship (Wright 2003: 5).9  
The second development is the emergence, since the late 1990s, of various contentious 
political and social interventions that can be loosely brought under the label of anti- or alter-
globalisation politics. The inscription of migration-related struggles within the framework of the 
anti-globalisation movement has not been an obvious and unproblematic development. In fact, 
the earlier forms of transnational anti-globalisation political interventions largely left migration 
issues aside, as illustrated for example by the absence of specifically migration-focussed 
workshops in the earlier editions of the World Social Forum. This was mostly due to the fact that 
the ‘globalisation’ of immigration controls was not as obvious as that of trade and finance and is 
still characterised by a complex intertwining of national and supranational practices. However, 
both analytically and practically, this gap has been significantly bridged and migration has been 
firmly inscribed on the WSF’s agenda since at least its fifth edition in 2005. In Europe, Sandro 
Mezzadra notes that the 2001 Genoa protests in Italy already saw the organisation of a large 
migrant rally, which he identifies as the first encounter between migrant organisations and the 
‘global movement': 
 
… the demonstration on 19 July 2001, which opened the protests against the G8 meeting 
in Genoa with the slogan ‘Freedom of movement - freedom without boundaries’, has put 
the issues of migrants before the ‘global movement’ born in Seattle for the first time. 
(Mezzadra 2004: 268) 
 
The European Social Forum (ESF), the regional expression of the so-called Global Justice 
Movement, has thus been strongly influenced by anti-racist and pro-migrant themes and, 
reciprocally, anti-capitalist events and social forums have been important moments in the 
development of pro-migrant groups and networks working transnationally in Europe. Most of 
my participants had directly participated in an ESF or another large anti/alter-globalist gathering, 
and the discourse, analysis and tactics of the anti-capitalist movement have had a strong influence 
on the ways in which these groups understand themselves and their struggle and design their 
actions and tactics. This might not be immediately obvious with all the interviewed groups, yet 
my participants recognise the relevance of the anti-capitalist critique in order to understand the 
EU's immigration and border regime.10 One of the participants summed up this close relationship 
as follows: ‘we are anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-debt of the third world. These are our values. But 
we also are action-oriented in our local context. We merge the local and the global’.11 Another 
one also stipulated that: ‘one cannot understand migrations today without internationalising the 
issue. This is why we have a global, in fact alter-global, approach’.12 In particular, it is clear to 
them that the border control practices of a given EU member state cannot be seen as simply the 
expression of an unjust national government. Rather, all the groups and networks inscribe their 
analysis within a larger reflection on the roles of borders globally, and their relationship with 
other global dynamics of domination and exploitation. Another aspect is the use by pro-migrant 
groups and networks in Europe of tools and tactics developed by anti-globalisation activists, such 
as transnational mailing lists and forms of action directed against non-state actors. The 
 
9 See also McNevin 2006 and Lowry and Nyers 2003. 
10 For example, MRN’s Director explained that the official narrative of his organisation tended to be more liberal and 
human rights-oriented but that it didn't invalidate a critical understanding of global migration nowadays.   
11 Interview with Fasti’s Anna Sibley (Paris, September 2012) 
12 Interview with Gisti’s Jean Pierre Alaux (Paris, September 2012) 
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intersection between the anti-globalisation movement’s politics and tactics and the particular 
traditions and cultures of the various groups participating in the research is a complex one but it 
has been a key structuring factor for migration struggles in Europe.  
Finally, the institutional terrain on which these groups and campaigns are fighting 
strongly diverges from that of previous pro-migrant initiatives. The participant groups and 
campaigns exist in particular local and national settings operating through their own political 
institutions but, at the same time, they all engage in a transnational political praxis. As previously 
mentioned, the transnationalisation of their work has been the result of the realisation that 
immigration and asylum controls had changed and had to be fought at different levels and by 
addressing different actors – in particular that there was a need to fight beyond national 
boundaries and to confront trans- and supranational institutions. The evolution of the centre of 
power and decision-making into a multi-layered and complex transnational and 
intergovernmental assemblage has thus called for new structures and tactics in order to efficiently 
address the new political and institutional setting in which they operate. 
 
 
When and Why: The Emergence of Transnational Pro-Migrant Actors in the EU 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that an increasing transnationalisation of migration struggles has 
been taking place in the EU in response to the harmonisation of immigration laws and policies in 
Europe, I asked my participants a series of questions concerning their relationship with the EU 
and the ways in which the process of communitarisation of legislative frameworks related to 
migration and asylum had affected their work. A strikingly consistent narrative emerged, 
identifying a number of key moments in the development of European legislation, which 
decisively encouraged activists to operate at the European level and to develop transnational links 
with groups in other EU member countries.  
The Europeanisation of legislative frameworks governing issues related to migration and 
asylum has been a key area of cooperation between EU member states at least since the 1985 
Schengen Agreement, which envisaged a zone of free movement between five countries of the 
European Community at the time (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). The rationale for Europeanising immigration and asylum policies was that the free 
movement of people within the EU/ECC space could only happen if, first, all member states 
applied identical criteria regarding entry requirements into their territory for ‘third country’ 
nationals and, second, if the controls which had been waived at the EU’s internal borders were 
reported and reinforced at its external borders. These legislations, which had started as inter-
governmental regulations, were fully incorporated into European legislation with the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The Treaty was implemented at the 1999 Tampere Summit, which was strongly 
criticised by European civil society organisations for its secrecy, lack of transparency and the 
association it made between ‘immigration’ and ‘security’ (Statewatch 2003). Subsequently, the 
harmonisation was further codified with the 2006 Schengen Borders Code13 and the 2010 
Schengen Visa Code14 which legislate on border surveillance, joint controls and cooperation 
between member states regarding border checks and govern the role of the European external 
border agency, Frontex. Another development brought about by the Schengen Agreement is the 
 
13 See Schengen Borders Code < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0001:0032:EN:PDF> [last accessed in March 2013]. 
14 See Schengen Visa Code <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995R1683:EN:HTML> [last accessed in March 2013]. 
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Schengen Information System (SIS), a policing information network that was created to 
supposedly compensate for any security ‘deficit’ that could be engendered by the removal of 
internal border controls in the EEC/EU and which constitutes a transnational database storing 
information concerning various ‘risk groups and individuals’, accessible by Europe’s police forces 
and security agencies (Lodge 2009: 142).  
 Several participants admitted that it was not until the mid- and late 1990s that they took 
full measure of what was happening at the EU level. They acknowledged feeling concerned 
following the 1985 signature of the Schengen agreement, in particular as it failed to address the 
issue of the status of ‘third country nationals’ and started to refer to the reinforcement of 
Europe's external borders, but it was not until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which created the 
EU and European citizenship as an exclusively derivative status, that the discriminatory and 
exclusive nature of the Union was fully grasped. Soon after Maastricht, the process of 
Europeanisation of immigration and asylum laws was initiated, boosted by the 1995 
implementation of Schengen. This process encouraged closer collaboration between activists in 
different EU member states, both to exchange information in order to understand what the 
effects of these developments were and to share ideas about how to resist them. An interviewee 
from Gisti summarised these evolutions as follows: 
 
At Gisti, there was a preoccupation since the late 1980s … regarding what would come 
out of the Schengen Agreement. Some of our members were paying close attention … to 
something which the French associations were not talking about - the implementation of 
this Schengen agreement, which was going to reorganise circulation inside what was then 
the Schengen area … and all the consequences it would have on the status of migrants in 
France… But it was really difficult to work with our traditional associative partners, 
because all this seemed very theoretical for these partners. It wasn’t there… Contrarily to 
what was happening in other countries, the French government never publicly announced 
the negotiations or what was being talked about in Brussels about the implementation of 
this Schengen Area (…) But we quickly anticipated that from this system would come out 
many things which would have rather serious implications, and that we had to be ready 
for what would come next. And thus to find partners elsewhere, outside France…15 
 
While it might have been the case that, at first, the developments were going unnoticed in France, 
participants in Italy which, like other Mediterranean countries, was suddenly turned into a border 
guard country for western and northern European member states, draw a very different picture:16  
 
In Italy, until the mid 1980s, we didn’t have any immigration law. Issues to do with 
migration and residency were still governed through a royal decree from the 1930s, which 
basically gave administrative discretion on the matter. Of course, I am not saying that 
Italy was a heaven for immigrants. But that changed very rapidly after 1995, when the 
Schengen Agreement was coming into place, and Italy was told it had to adopt 
immigration policies that were along the lines of those that existed in northern European 
countries. Not only the law changed, there was a discourse to go with it, and you could 
see the change in people’s attitude, you could see racist graffiti appearing on the walls … 
 
15 Interview with Gisti’s Claire Rodier (Paris, September 2012). 
16 Similarly, in Portugal, the post-Salazar immigration laws passed in the mid 1980s had to be strongly tightened 
under pressure from the EU in 1993, in preparation for the implementation of Schengen. 
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You know, there was definitely a new form of racist discourse in the media, by the 
politicians, that was being pushed forward, in the name of Europe.17  
 
It is at the occasion of the 1999 Tampere summit that, for the first time, these diverse 
experiences were brought together by activists. Schneider, a No Border activist and blogger, 
remembers the days leading up to the formation of the No Border network before 1999 as 
follows: 
 
It all began with a meeting in Amsterdam, at the margins of a big demonstration against 
the EU summit in 1997 ... The priorities and objectives of the political work in each 
country were gravely different, but what the groups had in common was the demand for 
practical, political intervention at the base i.e. grassroots politics. The new network was 
… concerned with systematically creating the preconditions for a Europe-wide 
collaboration, whose purpose was in the first place to enrich the every-day activities in 
each and every country … Yet, although a regular exchange of information was arranged 
amongst the participants of the first network meeting, the initial zest soon died away … 
However, this was about to change: in 1999 the network was renamed "Noborder" and 
relaunched with the European-wide protest action to mark the occasion of the EU's 
special summit "justice and the interior" in Tampere. This latter was expressly dedicated 
to the aim of standardizing the asylum and migration politics in the European context. In 
the preparation some Noborder groups had managed to connect with promising contacts 
in France and, above all, in Italy. On this basis a common European day-of-action was 
arranged (…) to protest in a decentralized but coordinated manner against a new chapter 
in the politics of separation: (…) more exclusion, more control, more deportation.18 
 
For these activists, the word Tampere became shorthand for the Europeanisation of immigration 
and asylum policy. It came to stand for the very process whereby a certain Europe, based on a 
system of segregation and discrimination and on a discourse of exclusion, was taking shape. It 
was a key moment in the history of many of the autonomous migrant solidarity groups: from 
then on, they started to consistently try to match the practices of national governments by 
making their tactics and activities similarly transnational. Following the Tampere counter-
demonstrations, the European No Border network emerged. 1999 was also the year when 
PICUM was established in Brussels. PICUM came about at the initiative of a group of grassroots 
organisations from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, which shared similar concerns 
regarding the lack of protection for undocumented migrants in the new European legal 
framework on immigration and asylum. PICUM’s Director explained that: 
 
As the laws around migration were being transferred into the legal structure of the EU, 
groups in various member states realised that … the issue of undocumented migrants was 
left out of these juridical developments and that they would not gain any form of 
protection through the process of Europeanisation. We felt undocumented migrants and 
the problems they face had to be defended in the EU, and the best way for us to have 
 
17 Interview with Italian activist Nidal (Rome, July 2012). 
18http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp;jsessionid=82879400D2D0FFB4F4C701D6D2584FD7?objectnumbe
r=44008  
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leverage was to join forces and literally ‘turn up the volume’: make our voices louder by 
shouting together.19 
 
Tampere called itself a summit on ‘freedom, justice and security’, presented as core tenets of the 
European project. But activists were quick to denounce that the quest for a European identity 
was being led at the expense of many other European residents: all those who did not have 
citizenship in one of the member states. European citizenship did not therefore move away from 
the exclusionary features of national identity discourses but, in fact, added an additional layer of 
exclusion for non-citizens.  
 
 
How and What: Activities, Tactics and Tools of Pan-European Pro-Migrant Actors  
 
With the successful institutionalisation of the nation-state, peaking in the late 18th and 19th 
centuries, political action and affiliations had become increasingly concentrated at the national 
level. In this paper I have argued that, in the case of the supranationalisation of political 
frameworks that is taking place under the auspices of the European Union, the dominant 
attempts at fostering a sense of shared political destiny among the ‘people of Europe has largely 
failed. Yet, a process of transnationalisation of contentious politics and identity has nonetheless 
been taking place in order to oppose and challenge discourses and policies coming from the EU. 
During the course of my interviews, I asked members of the participant organisations and 
campaigns to explain the ways in which they developed, strengthened and expanded pan-
European links. The sets of activities, tools and tactics they described fall into three broad 
categories: communication and decision-making, network (building and expanding) and 
organising joint protests and actions. I am using this classification for the sake of analytical clarity 
but many activities fall within at least two of these categories.  
 
Transnat ional communicat ion  
Communication tools used by pro-migrant groups across Europe can be divided into two 
separate, yet sometimes overlapping, categories: on the one hand, groups and campaigns develop 
internal communication tools and, on the other hand, they design ways to communicate with the 
wider public, the media, relevant political institutions and other groups focusing on different 
issues. As many scholars examining internal communication among activist networks have 
observed, mailing lists are the preferred communication tool for many activist groups and 
campaigns (Kavada 2007; Saeed, Rohde and Wulf 2011). For example, since 2003, Migreurop has 
run a public mailing list intended for the ‘circulation of information and debates about the 
European externalisation policies and detention centres for migrants’.20 The list currently has 982 
subscribers,21 which includes numerous groups. Subscription is opened to all those who are 
interested in receiving and sending relevant information. The average number of emails circulated 
is just over 100 per month. 22  However, Migreurop is organised through a number of working 
 
19 Interview with PICUM’s Director (Skype, June 2012). 
20http://archives.rezo.net/archives/migreurop.mbox/Y5XOJHJPMKROR5HKN4OMMFDBI5N3LZPV  
21 Figures checked on 19 March 2013. 
22 These are my own calculations based on list circulation during six months (July to December 2012). 
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groups devoted to organising the network’s activities related to specific topics.23  All these 
working groups have their own private mailing lists.  
Similarly, all No Border groups in Europe have set up local mailing lists where they 
exchange information relevant to their particular contexts, but there also exists a Europe-wide 
list, the Action 2 list, where information and announcements are exchanged between groups and 
activists across national contexts. The history of this list is an interesting illustration of the 
dynamics of transnationalisation of pro-migrant activists in Europe and the interaction between 
online and offline developments. It was agreed to set up the list in October 2004 in order to help 
coordinating a European day of action for migrants that had been called for at the European 
Social Forum (ESF) in London that year. This followed the success of the first European day of 
action ‘against detention centres and for the legalisation of all undocumented migrants’, which 
had taken place on 31 January 2004 and had seen demonstrations in 40 cities across Europe.24 
This day had been an important step in the networking process necessary for the 
Europeanisation of migration struggles. The callout for the second day of action aimed to build 
on this success in order to further develop communication structures transnationally. It was 
aimed at ‘all groups, networks and social movements, not only the ones working on migration-
related issues’.25 At the time, groups from Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the UK, Greece, 
Portugal, Belgium and Slovenia joined the Action 2 mailing list in order to communicate with 
each other about the demonstrations and actions they were planning in their local and national 
contexts at this occasion. After the second European day of action took place, the Action 2 list 
remained active and it is used to this day.  
Besides providing transnational communication structures, these mailing lists have also 
played in key role in ‘Europeanising’ issues, as one of the participants from Fasti put it:  
 
If we face a problem and we need other activists and organisations to know about it 
quickly, in order for example to elicit a quick response, well if we send an email to the list, 
the local problem becomes immediately European. 26  
 
In this sense, this communication process among activists and groups contributes to the  
construction of a more sophisticated analysis and a common discourse, based on the wide range 
of experiences and information circulated on the lists. It is worth noting here that this form of 
transnational communication tools were first developed and used by the anti-capitalist movement 
and later appropriated at various levels and in various ways by other types of groups and 
networks. They are another telling example of the influence of the ‘global’ anti-capitalist 
movement on activists in Europe and the West more generally.  
In order to engage in external communication, different types of tools, platforms and 
activities are used. The more established and institutionalised groups, such as MRN and PICUM, 
often produce a regular newsletter to keep members and/or interested groups and individuals 
informed of their activities as well as of relevant political and policy developments. For instance, 
PICUM first started distributing its newsletter in 2004. In 2011, the organisation decided to set 
up two different platforms for its public communication work. An electronic bulletin is now 
circulated on a fortnightly basis in English and a newsletter is produced every three months in six 
 
23 For example, Migreurop has a group working on detention, another on externalisation, as well as several working 
groups working on the different aspects of its campaigns. 
24 An archive of call outs for action can be found at http://www.meltingpot.org/rubrica119.html?art=30  
25 Ibid  
26 Interview with Anna Sibley from Fasti (Paris, September 2012).  
 24 
languages (French, German, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and Italian) as a summary of the 
previous six English bulletins.27 The bulletin focuses on significant developments concerning 
migrant rights at various policy levels (national, EU but UN). It also has a section session on 
events, publications and PICUM member organisations’ activities. PICUM decided to have a 
more regular bulletin but could not afford fortnightly translation hence the recourse to a quarterly 
multi-lingual newsletter. 28  Similarly, MRN sends out a weekly newsletter to around 5,000 email 
subscribers in the UK, Europe and beyond. It focuses on policy development in the UK and the 
EU but instead of simply relaying information produced elsewhere it also contains MRN’s own 
analysis of current topics and links to MRN’s blogs these issues. This newsletter was quoted as a 
reliable source of information on the sector by other individuals working in similar organisations 
in Europe.29  
External communication is also organised through events and publications, which groups, 
campaigns and organisations undertake in order to spread their message and discourse to a wider 
public, which might not be familiar with the issues they are working on. This type of external 
communication often requires a thorough work of ‘re-framing’ so as to make the analyses more 
accessible and engaging for people who are familiar with pro-migrant work. The different ways in 
which activists and groups frame their discourse depending on their audience can be exemplified 
by Migreurop’s ‘Map of the camps’. The map, of which five editions have been published so far 
in several languages, 30 visually represents the various centres and sites of migrant detention in 
Europe and at its borders. While Migreurop also produces written literature on the issue of 
migrant detention, the addition of a map has been a key tool to translate often complex and 
detailed information into an accessible and easily communicable message.  
Organising or participating in public events is also a common tactic used by groups and 
organisations in order to communicate their message to people who would not usually be on 
their mailing lists or read their newsletters. Events follow a wide range of formats, from 
academic-type seminars and panel discussions, workshops and stalls at festivals and conferences, 
to cultural events such as concerts, exhibitions and film screenings. When participating in events, 
organisations and groups might participate in an event that is not directly related to migration 
with the aim of bringing the issue to the attention of a new audience. This could be seen as public 
communication through a process of mainstreaming migration-related issues into various other 
circles. In this respect, it is interesting to know that, for many years, autonomous activists who 
then became part of networks such as No Border and Migreurop, were meeting at the fringe of 
other transnational manifestations, such as the ESF. This allowed them to meet without 
necessarily having the resources to organise transnational gatherings themselves. Yet, it was also a 
way to make sure migration as a theme was represented at these events. In a similar vein, groups 
and organisations participate in trade union conferences (NOII, Fasti, Gisti) and pan-European 
conferences (Migreurop, European Alternatives, PICUM).   
 
Bui lding and expanding networks 
I have distinguished between communication and network-building activities in the sense that 
network-building work, both internal (consolidation) and external (expansion), has the clear 
intention of recruiting and retaining members. ‘Maintaining a network alive’ says Migreurop 
 
27 Interview with Anna Sibley from Fasti (Paris, September 2012).  
28 Interview with Michele Levoy from Picum (Skype, June 2012) 
29 Interview with PICUM’s Director (Skype, June 2012). 
30 The fifth edition is accessible online at http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/jpg/map_18-
1_L_Europe_des_camps_2011_v11_EN.jpg.  
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coordinator Eva Ottavy, ‘is not a small task; it is a systematic and organised job. This job requires 
structures and tools, which allow equal participation of all and solidify the links between our 
various members’. 31  The wide availability of online tools, which allow the active involvement of 
network members or fellow activists, is of course crucial in this regard. Eva Ottavy adds: 
 
We are not a political party, we are an associative network, and what that means is that we 
do not have a centralised decision-making power and then members implementing them. 
Our network is a horizontal platform, which means we need tools to allow horizontality 
in our everyday work. And if you want a network to be transnational, you must develop 
transnational horizontal networking tools. (…) This is why we have our working groups, 
and we internationalise the daily life of the network, we have more and more Skype 
meetings so that our colleagues in other countries can participate as much as people here 
in France or nearby. And we also do a big work of translation. 32 
 
Migreurop also organises yearly rencontres internationales (‘international meetings’) for its members. 
The first such meeting took place in Seville, Spain, in 2005. Given the network’s wide 
geographical spread, it has since tried to have these meetings in various countries inside and 
outside Europe and to cover the travel costs of representatives from its member organisations. 
There have been rencontres in Rabat, Morocco (2006), Paris, France (2009), Istanbul, Turkey 
(2010) and Cecina, Italy (2011). The rencontres are, above all, the main opportunity for network 
members to meet each other in person and, therefore, play a vital part in the strengthening of the 
network. As the network’s coordinator argues ‘meeting in person adds something qualitatively 
different: it does not mean we cannot work with people we have only met virtually, but 
something gets strengthened when there is face to face contact’.33  A number of partner and like-
minded organisations are also invited to attend these meetings, which has been crucial to the 
expansion of the network.  
One should not, however, forget the limitations of such inter/transnational meetings: 
they generally take place on a yearly basis and even where conscious efforts of inclusion are 
deployed, they will tend to exclude those who cannot obtain visas or whose individual situation 
prevents them from travelling (having children and so on). Those pragmatic constraints might 
shape, to an extent, activists’ profiles. Though they can be successful at reinforcing links between 
groups in the case of a tight network like Migreurop, they can sometimes also be mere 
formalities, with little concrete outcomes. The Communication Officer at MRN admitted that  
 
some of these things [European meetings] are definitely over-estimated. (…) We still go, 
but I find very little value in that sort of, err… (…) It is sort of an external initiative: a 
“we need to share experiences, and we need to talk” (…). But it is always the same 
people, the Brussels people and a few more who are reps of big NGOs in member 
countries… Or maybe sometimes you meet groups that are so different to you that you 
don’t really see the usefulness of meeting them… On the other hand, some of the less 
formal ways of collaboration have a lot more added value to them… the problem with 
that is that it is very difficult to sustain them because you kind of, I mean, you obviously 
need funding for pretty much everything you do. 34   
 
31 Interview with Migreurop’s Coordinator Eva Ottavy (Paris, September 2012). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Interview with MRN’s Communication Officer, Jan Brulc (London, April 2012). 
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This quote above touches on three important issues characteristic of large transnational events: 
the risk that only a small cosmopolitan elite will be represented, the varied organisational models 
across the groups and the obstacles to collaboration that they can pause and the lack of 
autonomous resources available to most transnational networks and campaigns (see della Porta 
2009: 34). However, the limitations that this type of events may entail can be contrasted with the 
efficiency of what we can call ‘encounter in action’.  
Building and strengthening networks can come as a positive by-product of initiatives or 
activities organising with other primary purposes, such as protesting, and the weaving of links 
does not only take place on the day and site of the action itself, but throughout the preparation 
process. Organising a coordinated day of action, for instance, may not eventually lead to a 
physical encounter between the various groups planning an event in their national settings, yet it 
may encourage people to be in contact with one another and to collaborate, hence producing and 
strengthening links and networks. Describing a ESF, Nicole Doerr (2006) notes that: 
 
Often, representatives of local groups or activists from different countries came together 
at the transnational level with more open-mindedness and curiosity about each other’s 
histories than at the national level, where cleavages within and between social movements 
have consolidated along traditional fractures and personal enmities. 
 
This is an interesting remark that can give us an indication of the importance of groups’ 
participation in transnational events for the consolidation of networks. Almost all the participants 
to my research said they had participated in at least one transnational event or meeting, such as 
the World Social Forum, European Social Forum or a European Day of Action. In the section 
below, I will focus on a number of events and actions that have taken prominence in the 
migration struggles field in Europe and analyse their ability to disrupt dominant discourses and 
practices. While I will primarily discuss how tactics are used and shared by activists with the 
intended purpose of protesting and disrupting, it is also important to keep in mind their 
networking potential.  
 
Transnational is ing protes t    
Certain forms of European-wide protests have by now become strongly associated with the 
migration field. An important example in this regard is the No Border camps. No Border camps 
deserve particular attention as a form of politics and activism that redefines the scope of 
contentious action in the field of migration in Europe whilst at the same time following a long 
tradition of protest tactics, that of the protest camp. No Border camps are also of interest, I 
would argue, because they have influenced the discourses and practices of other pro-migrant 
groups by bringing direct action to the migration struggle field and by expanding the boundaries 
of the acceptable discourse when it comes to the issues of migration, sovereignty and citizenship. 
Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the No Border camps, it is useful to consider once 
more the specificity of No Border as a network.  
It would be difficult to qualify No Border as a ‘movement’, at least in the traditional 
sense, due to its largely decentralised, diffuse and transnational nature. Many No Border activists 
consider ‘No Border’ as a label that can be claimed by anyone subscribing to such politics, which 
tacitly implies a strong anarchist affiliation. This anarchist tradition is better understood in terms 
of the tactics, methods and practices used by the network, rather than as a strictly defined 
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ideological position.35 No Border activists believe in horizontal, non-hierarchical structures of 
organising and reject the binary identities of citizen/non-citizen, legal/illegal.36 The network is a 
social and political site, that does not operate through a permanent membership model, but 
rather through a common thread of political beliefs and principles that links a number of radical 
migrant solidarity groups and campaigns together.  
Pausing to reflect on the camp as a contentious political practice in the context of my 
research is particularly relevant, not least because of the symbolism associated with camps in the 
field of migration. Indeed, recent literature on migration controls and securitisation has focused 
on the camp as a ‘zone of exception’ paradigmatic of sovereign power (Agamben 1998). The 
image of a pro-migrant camp is in this sense highly powerful. On the other hand, the camp as a 
tactic of protest (exemplified by peace camps but also, for instance, in campsites set up by 
homeless people in urban centres37) also has a long history that has largely escaped scholarly 
examination. The camp must thus be examined as a political act establishing a site of solidarity 
that asserts the right to presence and belonging (hooks 1990) and proposes a space for the 
existence of new political subjectivities (Walters 2006).  
No Border camps can be analysed within the tradition of camps as a political act: they are 
set up at particular geographical locations of symbolic relevance for the European border regime 
and emphasise the relationship between situational experiences and larger dynamics at work in 
Europe. They also aim to re-politicise the sanitised everydayness of repressive immigration and 
border controls by exposing their devastating consequences on people’s lives.38 No Border camps 
have taken place at physical borders, at immigration detention centres, near airports associated 
with forcible deportation and, as was the case with the Strasbourg and Brussels camps, at 
emblematic sites of EU power and decision-making. These camps can be looked at through 
Hakin Bey’s notion of ‘temporary autonomous zones’ (Walters 2006) in the sense that they aim 
to create temporary spaces that elude formal structures of control. Typically, a No Border camp 
will be a horizontal space of experience-sharing and political debates, with various workshops 
and discussions, as well as a number of planned and spontaneous direct actions and protests 
aimed at the ‘disruption of the running of the border regime’. 39 In addition to their protesting 
dimension, No Border camps are key moments in the consolidation of the network, with activists 
from the various groups operating under the label in different countries travelling to the camp. 
Whilst local and national groups have regular meetings, the camps are the most important 
occurrence of network-wide (European) meetings, bringing together people from different 
countries face to face to conjointly develop the analysis and tactics of the network as a whole. 
They are also moments when the network expands by engaging with the new activists, migrants 
and local communities and asserting a publicly visible presence through protests and actions in 
the cities and countries where they take place. The network has also adopted innovative tactics 
and technological tools to expand beyond the limitations imposed by geographical locations, as 
described by No Border activist Kuemmer:   
 
[No Border] actions were expanded and the ideas spread. This resulted last summer in a 
border camp chain, which started in Tarifa in southern Spain (Spain-Africa) and 
 
35 Interview with No Borders UK’s Sean (London, April 2012) 
36 Ibid. 
37 See for example in France: http://www.youphil.com/fr/article/04149-rencontre-avec-les-expulses-de-la-cite-des-
4000?ypcli=ano 
38 Interviews and personal conversations with No Borders UK’s activist (London, April 2012 and on-going) 
39 Interview with No Borders UK’s activist Alex (London, January 2013). 
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continued through Krykni (Poland-Ukraine), Lendava (Slovenia) and the internal border 
at the Frankfurt airport (Germany) … Permanently crossing borders, the noborderTOUR 
connected border camps with other sites of resistance … Connections were also made in 
virtual space: the "borderstream" visualized three border camps that took place 
simultaneously ... Strasbourg 2002 is now the first event organized by the entire noborder 
network as a joint action with anti-racist social movements, groups and individuals from 
15 different countries. 40  
 
Organising transnational events, campaigns and days of action is a crucial objective for all 
the participant networks and groups in a double sense: to stage various forms of public protest as 
well as to forge and consolidate transnational links and alliances. Eva Ottavy explains that inter-
associative campaigns are an increasing focus for Migreurop, which used to primarily focus on 
internal networking work, but has now realised the ‘complementarity between strengthening the 
network inside, and expanding it outside’. 41 The case of B4P is illustrative in this respect: the 
campaign was largely supported by Migreurop and its member organisations, but a number of 
other associations, groups and individual activists also supported it in a variety of ways. 
According to a participant in B4P:  
 
It was great to take part [in B4P] as it brought us closer to other activists and groups. We 
might have known them through emails but now we feel we have comrades. And new 
projects have come out of the campaign, like the Watch the Med idea. This campaign was 
just the start of something bigger! 42     
 
An interesting effect of the transnationalisation of pro-migrant protests in Europe has 
been the sharing and mixing of tactics and strategies between and across groups and networks. 
For instance, B4P’s idea of a flotilla stopping over at various symbolic points of the EU border 
regime around the Mediterranean Sea, and staging symbolic actions and protests to denounce the 
effect of EU policies on people’s lives, strongly inspired another campaign: one year later, in the 
summer of 2013, a new flotilla project called ‘Voices from the Border’ took place with 
participants from the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK. One of the ‘Voices from the 
Borders’ main members, a Dutch activist based in Amsterdam, was involved in B4P the previous 
summer and decided to initiate a similar campaign in his own context and with another set of 
partners. This is an interesting illustration of the ways in which tactics used by pro-migrant 
groups and campaigns travel beyond their original site and are re-appropriated and re-used in 
different spaces by other activists. 
Another example of this has to do with the forms of actions that pro-migrant groups and 
activists stage. Organising conventional symbolic actions and protests has been a common tactic. 
For instance, at the launch of the Frontexit campaign, in Brussels in March 2013, fake migrant 
raids were orchestrated with Migreurop activists staging street arrests in public spaces in order to 
make this practice visible to passers-by. However, some groups and networks, such as the No 
Border and Stop Deportation networks, have focused on more unconventional direct rather than 
symbolic actions with the aim of actually interrupting immigration control practices. 43  These 
include actions intended to disrupt, delay or stop immigration raids and forcible deportations, 
 
40 http://www.republicart.net/disc/hybridresistance/kuemmer01_en.htm  
41 Interview with Eva Ottavy (Paris: September 2012). 
42 Interview with a participant in B4P (Lampedusa: July 2012). 
43 Interview with No Border activist Sean (London: April 2012). 
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where activists attempt to physically block the arrests or deportation of migrants. An important 
aspect of direct action is that it does not try to pressure national and European authorities into 
stopping or changing their policies. Rather, it aims to disrupt the process through direct 
intervention, using various types of traditional and innovative protests, occupations and 
blockades. Such actions also often target other, non-state actors, such as the security companies, 
travel agents and airlines complicit in forcible deportations. Tactics include the occupation of the 
company’s offices or calling for the boycotts of particular businesses.  
This is perhaps the most visible illustration of the way in which migration struggles in 
Europe have been adopting some of the tactics from the global anti-capitalist or anti-
globalisation movement, as well as of the new political and institutional terrain on which some 
pro-migrant groups are operating. This Europeanisation of immigration law has placed activists 
in the face of a new type of power and decision-making structure, characterised by its elusiveness 
and lack of transparency, as seen in the description of the EU as a political structure in earlier 
chapter. The issues of governance in the field of migration may not necessarily be the same as 
those in the areas of trade and finance, where anti-globalisation activists understood the 
unwillingness of individual states to apply pressure on corporate power and, thus, increasingly 
adopted direct actions tactics aimed both at disrupting international meetings (such as G8 and 
G20 summits) and at targeting and pressurising corporations. Yet, I would argue that the lack of 
representation mechanisms in the EU, as well as in national states applying European law, has led 
to the adoption of similar tactics. Indeed, the process of Europeanisation of migration law and of 
transnationalisation of migration struggles has led to the radicalisation of the ‘repertoires of 
contention’ used by pro-migrant activists and groups. For example, tactics originally used mostly 
by No Border-type groups, such as the denunciation of and ‘reputational damage’ to companies 
and businesses involved in the border regime and the ‘deportation machine’, are now commonly 
used by other more traditional pro-migrant groups and campaigns.  
The history of this convergence of analytical, political and strategic frameworks and its 
relation to the Europeanisation of migration and asylum law on the hand and the development of 
other transnational social movements in Europe one the other hand was summed up by one of 
the participants as follows:  
Our first attempts (…) to work with European partners were a lot more difficult (…) I 
really think there was a shift, in the years 2000s, in the relationships we were able to 
establish with our European partners. I think one aspect is that indeed migration policies 
have Europeanised and that similar issues started to emerge (…) And there also was, as I 
mentioned with the European Social Forum and the World Social Forums, the influence 
of the social movements, that started developing in all domains, not only migration but a 
lot of domains – housing, women struggles… (…) It started mixing people, mixing 
activists, making them meet, speak to each other… (…) And this created a sort of culture 
that enabled the emergence of a common openness, of common values and of common 
actions.44 
 
44 Interview with Claire Rodier (Paris: September 2012). 
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Conclusion 
The process of harmonisation of migration and asylum laws in the EU has involved legal, 
discursive and practical developments, which have caused grievances and encouraged contentious 
reactions within the migrant solidarity activist scene in different European countries. The 
transnationalisation of resistance has been seen as essential in order to ‘match the level of the 
attack’, or has organically developed in response to some of the transnational practices of the EU. 
However, activists seem to require concrete examples of the consequences of the legal and 
discursive developments regarding migration and asylum in the EU for their awareness of the 
importance of activism at the European level to be raised. An important question that my 
research is also addressing is that of the emergence of collective, transnational European 
identities and alternative political subjectivities. Indeed, many of my participants only saw Europe 
as a negative reference point and not as a space where positive political interventions could take 
place. Instead, a series of regional, international or non-European cross-border identities were 
formulated and re-enacted. The question of whether migrant solidarity struggles in Europe can 
become a strong and robust social movement in the absence of a unified discourse and a shared 
identity thus remains to be explored.  
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Abstract 
 
Archimedes purportedly announced, "Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to 
place it, and I shall move the world.” Archimedes was referring to how the use of a lever could 
provide leverage by amplifying an input force to create a greater output force executed against an 
object. Thus, the basic elements of a lever include effort, load or resistance, a lever arm, pivoting 
point and a fulcrum. In this theoretical paper, I have mapped several concepts onto the following 
elements of a lever; the psychological world onto ‘effort’, the socio-material world onto ‘load’, 
history, culture, and tradition onto the ‘lever arm’, temporality onto the ‘pivoting point’, narratives 
onto the ‘fulcrum’ and a ‘chronotope’ onto the ground. Who is the ‘One’ that attempts to move the 
‘other’ and how does he use the elements of a ‘lever’ to do so? In a phallocratic culture, the 
difference between a set of dualities is constructed as binary opposites and the positive terms, 
which dominate the binary, are linked to one particular sex. Thus, man (the ‘One’) is valued over 
woman (its negative ‘other’). If we are to transform culture we need to destabilise the binary 
opposition that is founded in the male/female couple (Cixous, 1981). Thus, in this paper I 
compare mechanical nature of a lever with the dichotomous patriarchal social system, in which 
the masculine dominates the construction of meaning. I use the elements of a ‘lever’ to illustrate 
how the reproduction of a phallocratic culture might occur. This patriarchal social system follows 
the principles of digital computing in that it encodes ‘data’ that are associated with the masculine 
and feminine into binary oppositions. However, the ‘cyborg’ (Haraway, 1991) as a quantum 
machine, can exist in more than one state simultaneously. The cyborg maintains a state of 
‘quantum superposition’ and ‘quantum entanglement’ because when it is in one state of a binary, 
it partly exists in the other state simultaneously. Due to this entanglement, each member of the 
binary must be delineated relative to one another. I thus conceptualise the cyborg at the centre of 
this lever as it embodies the self as a psychological, socio-material and cultural phenomenon thus 
providing an interpretive entry point to understanding ontology as the entanglement of subject 
and object, space and time, matter and meaning, history and fiction. Furthermore, the cyborg 
utilises narratives (stories) to reconstruct identity in the interplay of duality.  
 
Keywords: binary oppositions, diffraction, cyborg, quantum superposition and entanglement, 
narrative identity, tradition and time-space.  
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Introduction  
 
I have divided this theoretical paper into seven components. I begin the discussion with the 
practice of diffractive (Barad, 2007), which has been adopted in order to weave a polyphonic 
tapestry out of multi-disciplinary identity threads and diffractive patterns. Secondly, I explicate 
why multiple theoretical perspectives have been mapped onto the metaphor of a lever and the 
cyborg (Haraway, 1991). Next, I demonstrate that in a phallocratic culture the difference between 
a set of dualities is constructed as binary opposites and the positive terms, which dominate the 
binary, are linked to one particular sex. Man is valued over woman (its negative other). If we are 
to transform culture we need to destabilise the binary opposition that is founded in the 
male/female couple (Cixous, 1981). Thus in the fourth component of this paper, I explicate how 
the elements of a ‘lever’ could be used to portray the reproduction of a phallocratic culture. I 
then discuss how Haraway’s (1991) notion of the cyborg is situated in a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 
2004) as it offers a way out of the dualistic traditions that have created boundaries between 
self/other, human/animal, organism/machine, culture/nature, physical/non-physical, and 
male/female. Building on the previous discussion of how a dichotomous patriarchal social system 
could be compared to the mechanical nature of a lever, I argue that this patriarchal social system 
follows the principles of digital computing in that it encodes ‘data’ that are associated with the 
masculine and feminine into binary oppositions. However, I theorise the ‘cyborg’ (Harway, 1991) 
as a quantum machine, as it can exist in more than one state simultaneously. The cyborg 
maintains a state of ‘quantum superposition’ and ‘quantum entanglement’ because when it is in 
one state of a binary, it partly exists in the other state simultaneously. Due to this entanglement, 
each member of the binary must be described relative to one another. Lastly, I elucidate how the 
cyborg utilises narratives to reconstruct identity in the interplay of these dualities. 
 
 
The practice of diffraction  
 
In line with the annual UEL yearbook title, “Crossing Conceptual Boundaries” I have adopted a 
diffractive methodology in reading identity through multi-disciplinary concepts in an attempt to 
“make evident the entangled structure of the changing and contingent ontology of the world, 
including the ontology of knowing” (Barad, 2007, p. 73). Barad (2012) notes that the 
entanglement of matter and meaning become evident in the “resonances and dissonances” (p. 50) 
of multiple interacting domains. Geometrical optics which is “completely agnostic about whether 
light is a particle or a wave or anything else” (ibid, p. 52) deliberates the subject as separate to the 
object; thus, knowledge is created at a distance. Whereas, in physical optics, diffraction enables 
one to examine the object as well as the apparatus, resulting in the entanglement of the subject 
and object (ibid). Barad writes: “Diffraction, understood using quantum physics, is not just a 
matter of interference, but of entanglement, an ethico-onto-epistemological matter … It 
underlines the fact that knowing is a direct material engagement” (ibid, p. 52).  
 In this paper, I do not use the practice of diffraction to theorise identity but rather as a tool 
to weave a polyphonic tapestry out of multi-disciplinary identity threads. These conceptual 
threads include the following; binarism (Rutherford, 1990; Barret, and Phillips, 1992; Cixous, 
1981), cyborg (Haraway, 1991), digital and quantum computing, quantum superposition and 
entanglement, culture (Kuhn, 2002), tradition (Gadamer, 1982; Ricoeur, 1991), belonging (Yuval-
Davis, 2011), imagined communities (Anderson, 1996), narrative (Andrews, Squire and 
Tamboukou, 2008; Bruner, 2002; Crites, 1986; Fay, 1996; Freeman, 1993; Josselson, 1995; 
McAdams, 1993; Polkinghorne, 1988; Reissman, 2008), idem-identity and ipse-identity (Ricoeur, 
 37 
1991), narrative identity (Ricoeur, 1988; 1991), temporality, and chronotope (Bakhtin, 1981). 
 
 
A metaphorical lever as a conceptual matrix of binary oppositions 
 
These multiple theoretical perspectives have been mapped onto the metaphor of a lever and the 
cyborg (Haraway, 1991) for two reasons; firstly to determine the relational functionality of each 
element in the reproduction of a phallocratic culture and secondly to identify diffractive patterns 
in the formation of narrative identity. As mentioned, Archimedes purportedly said, "Give me a 
lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world.” Archimedes 
was referring to how the use of a lever could provide leverage by amplifying an input force to 
create a greater output force executed against an object. Thus, the basic elements of a lever 
include effort, load or resistance, a lever arm, pivoting point and a fulcrum. I have conceptualised 
a diagram (see figure 1) that projects several concepts onto the following elements of a lever; the 
psychological world onto ‘effort’, the socio-material world onto ‘load’, culture, and tradition onto 
the ‘lever arm’, temporality onto the ‘pivoting point’, narratives onto the ‘fulcrum’ and a ‘chronotope’ 
onto the ground. Who is the ‘One’ that attempts to move the ‘other’ and how does he use the 
elements of a ‘lever’ to do so?  
 
Feminist theory is concerned with deconstructing the hierarchical binary oppositions that 
underpin Western culture (Barret and Phillips, 1992). Phallocentric patriarchies and dualistic 
traditions, which privilege the masculine and follow the logics of “domination of women, people 
of colour, nature, workers, animals” persist (Haraway, 1991, p. 177). Haraway (ibid) notes:  
 
To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an 
illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other 
is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two 
are too many. 
 
In a phallocratic culture, the difference between a set of dualities is constructed as binary 
opposites: culture versus nature, psychological versus social, reason versus emotion, whiteness 
versus blackness, mind versus body, active versus passive, subject versus object, self versus other, 
and male versus female. The hierarchal system of false polarities is created so the positive terms, 
which dominate the binary, are linked to one particular sex; thus, man (the ‘One’) is valued over 
woman (its negative ‘other’).  Males are situated in privileged positions of domination in a 
patriarchal social system as they occupy the space of culture, psyche, reason, ‘whiteness’, active, 
mind, subject, self, and sameness whereas women are set aside to occupy the space of nature, 
social, emotion, ‘blackness’, passive, body, object, other, and difference.  
Echoing this view, Cixous (1981, p. 44) contends that if we are to transform culture we 
need to destabilise the binary opposition that is founded in the male/female couple:  
 
In fact, in every theory of culture, every theory of society, the whole conglomeration of 
symbolic systems –everything, that is, that’s spoken, everything that’s organised as 
discourse, art, religion, the family, language … it is all ordered around the hierarchical 
oppositions that come back to the man/woman opposition, an opposition that can only 
be sustained by means of a difference posed by cultural discourse as ‘natural’. 
 
 
I propose that the elements of a ‘lever’ (see figure 1) could be used to portray the 
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reproduction of a phallocratic culture. The dichotomous patriarchal social system, which 
privileges the masculine in meaning making, is compared to the mechanical nature of a lever. I 
have placed the positive terms that are associated with the masculine on the dominant side of the 
lever arm that represents the self or ‘effort/meaning making’. Analogously, I have projected the 
negative terms that are associated with the feminine on the side that represents the other or 
‘resistance’. Over time, individual memories extend into a web of meanings that bind the 
material/symbolic, social/personal, and historical/psychical. This network of interconnections 
coalesces in individual life narratives (Kuhn, 2002). The intertwining of personal and public 
histories that form cultural memory form the terrain, as represented by a ‘lever arm’, of people’s 
'historically effected consciousness' (Gadamer, 1982). Narratives, as represented by the ‘fulcrum’, 
are the point on which culture (i.e. lever arm) pivots.  
Thus through tradition, we inherit prejudices or “fore-meanings” (Gadamer, 1982) that 
constitute our being. Tradition serves as the terrain for understanding and provides a ‘horizon’ or 
larger context of meaning from which we may view the world (Gadamer, 1982). Gadamer insists 
that prejudices, which are open to change, should be continually subjected to critical examination, 
“True prejudices must sill finally be justified by rational knowledge” (p. 242). Tradition is 
constituted by the interaction of sedimentation and innovation, as “[t]he phenomenon of 
traditionality is the key to the functioning of narrative models and, consequently, of their 
identification” (Ricoeur, 1991b, p. 24). Accordingly, through the play of sedimentation and 
innovation, we continually participate in producing, determining, and creating new ways of 
belonging to tradition. “Tradition is not simply a precondition into which we come, but we 
produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition and 
hence further determine ourselves” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 261). Belonging is constructed through 
narratives (stories) of individual and collective identities and emotional attachments (Yuval-Davis, 
2011).  
In addition, belonging is affected by the ways in which social locations and identities are 
valued and judged by society (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Social locations not only refer to people’s 
positionality in the intersections of social divisions (i.e. ‘race’, gender, class, age, sexuality etc.) but 
also the positionality of categories along an axis of power in society, which changes with different 
historical moments and contexts (ibid). Hegemonic political powers maintain and reproduce 
categories of social divisions by the construction of boundaries that determine the standards of 
‘normality’ and access to economic, political, social, intellectual, and cultural capital (Yuval-Davis, 
2006; Bourdieu, 1983).  
As the masculine dominates the construction of meaning in a phallocratic culture, 
narratives (stories) may be used as a tool to “reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of 
naturalized identities” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175). When narratives are used to assemble varied 
possibilities of meaning into fixed dichotomies it creates binaries, which reduce the “potential of 
difference into polar opposites” (Rutherford, 1990. p. 21). Following Rutherford's (1990) insight 
into binarism, he states that it:  
 
operates in the same way as splitting and projection: the centre expels its anxieties, 
contradictions and irrationalities onto the subordinate term, filling it with the antithesis of 
its own identity; the Other, in its very alienness, simply mirrors and represents what is 
deeply familiar to the centre, but projected outside of itself (p. 22).  
 
Rutherford posits that when new identities that attempt to “break the logic of the 
otherness of binarism” (p. 22) are produced on the margins they are unable to fully articulate 
their own and others’ experiences. As a result, language becomes a site of struggle because 
political ideologies attempt to protect the status of meaning from new identities that threaten to 
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deconstruct “those forms of knowledge that constitute the subjectivities, discourses and 
institutions of the dominant, hegemonic [and phallocentric] formations” (ibid). Williams (1989) 
delineates this “struggle for a voice as being at the very edge of semantic availability” (as cited in 
Rutherford, 1990, p. 22).  
 
 
The cyborg as a quantum machine: superposition and entanglement 
 
Kristeva (as cited in Moi, 1988, p. 6) recommends that feminist critique should be 
situated in a “third space: that which deconstructs [and denaturalises] all identity, all binary 
oppositions, all phallologenertic positions” and reveal the mechanisms of oppression in 
ideologies that are produced by phallocentric patriarchies. The aim is not to reverse or synthesise 
the binary oppositions, as this would maintain a hierarchal structure but rather to collapse them 
or find a way to accentuate their coexistence. I argue that Haraway’s (1991) notion of the cyborg, 
a “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a 
creature of fiction” (p. 149) is situated in this ‘third space’ as it offers a way out of the dualistic 
traditions that have created boundaries between self/other, human/animal, organism/machine, 
culture/nature, physical/non-physical, and male/female.  Haraway writes:  
  
Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect 
communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central 
dogma of phallogocentrism ... Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the 
basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that 
marked them as other. The tools are often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and 
displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities. In retelling origin stories, 
cyborg authors subvert the central myths of origin of Western culture ... Feminist cyborg 
stories have the task of recoding communication and intelligence to subvert command 
and control (p.175). 
 
 As discussed, the elements of a ‘lever’could be used to depict the reproduction of a 
phallocratic culture. I argue that a patriarchal social system (as represented by a mechanical lever) 
follows the principles of digital computing in that it encodes data into binary digits. However the 
cyborg, as a quantum machine, can exist in more than one state simultaneously. Put differently, 
digital computing obeys the laws of classical physics and require data to be encoded into binary 
digits or bits (i.e. a unit of information that is represented as 0 or 1).  However, quantum 
computing harnesses phenomena in quantum mechanics to perform operations on data and 
create a new mode of information processing. Its unit of information (i.e. quantum bit or qubit) 
is not binary but quaternary as a qubit can exist as a 0 or 1 or both 0 and 1 simultaneously (Dirac, 
1947). This phenomenon is called ‘quantum superposition’ which maintains that when a physical 
system is in one state, it partly exists in each of two or more other states simultaneously (Dirac, 
1947). Another phenomenon (which is a product of superposition) is called is ‘quantum 
entanglement’. Schrödinger (1935, p. 555) notes:  
 
When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective representatives, enter 
into temporary physical interaction due to known forces between them, and when after a 
time of mutual influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be described 
in the same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its 
own. ... By the interaction the two representatives have become entangled. 
The binary oppositions that are associated with the masculine and feminine are 
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represented as two states, 0 and 1 respectively (see figure 1). I argue that the cyborg maintains a 
‘quantum superposition’ because when it is in one state of a binary, it partly exists in the other 
state simultaneously. Identity is (re)constructed in the interplay and entanglement of these 
dualities.  I thus conceptualise the cyborg at the centre of this lever as it embodies the self as a 
psychological, socio-material and cultural phenomenon thus providing an interpretive entry point 
to understanding ontology as the entanglement of subject and object, space and time, matter and 
meaning, history and fiction. When one state (e.g. organism) interacts with the other (e.g. 
machine), each member of the binary must then be delineated relative to one another.  
 
The cyborg imagery entangles these dualistic traditions by illuminating our embodiment 
of machines as an aspect of our being as well as the possibility of rewriting our bodies and history 
and creating new ways of being and knowing (Haraway, 1991). Identities are understood as 
relational, and (re)constructed in networks of relationships with others and language in time 
(Crites, 1986; Fay, 1996; Freeman, 1993). Thus, cyborg politics is a "powerful infidel 
heteroglossia” (Haraway, 1991, p. 181) that necessitates “both a destroying and a building of 
machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories" (ibid) as well as being open to the 
“pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and [the] responsibility in their construction” (ibid, p. 
150).  
 
 
The narrative construction of identity in the interplay of duality  
 
 I now explore how the cyborg utilises narrative to reconstruct identity in the interplay of 
these dualities. I claim that narratives create the possibility for multiple selves to emerge in 
response to duality.  As illustrated in figure 1, ‘identity as sameness’ (or idem) contains elements 
of self and other whereas the interplay between the same and other is ipseity or ‘identity as self’ 
(Ricoeur, 1991). The dual aspects of self and other in idem-identity enable the cyborg to 
approach the question ‘what am I?’through the interplay of sameness and otherness.   
Ricoeur (1991a) differentiates between the following four senses of ‘identity a sameness’: 
“Identification as re-identification of the same,” extreme resemblance, discontinuity and 
“permanence over time” (p. 74). The fourth sense, ‘permanence over time’ causes problems to 
ipseity or the self because of the tendency to attribute “some immutable substrate” to this 
permanence (ibid). Ipseity and sameness overlap when one poses the question of ‘who’ in the 
domain of action, the action belongs to the agent or the self who did it (Ricoeur, 1991a). “Indeed 
it is legitimate to ask what sort of permanence belongs to a self in light of ascription … this self 
constancy … seems to be to the permanence over time of the idem”  (ibid, p. 75).  
This ‘self constancy’ offers a way out of sameness and otherness because the narrative 
plot facilitates the mediation of permanence and change which creates a model of “discordant 
concordance” (Ricoeur, 1991b, p. 32) upon which narrative identity may be constructed. Ricoeur 
(1988) remarks:  
 
Self-sameness, ‘self-constancy’ can escape the dilemma of Same and Other to the extent 
that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic 
identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. The self characterised by 
self-sameness may then be said to be refigured by the reflective application of such 
narrative configurations. Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, 
constitutive of self constancy, can include change, mutuality, within the cohesions of one 
lifetime (p. 246).  
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The cyborg maintains a state of ‘quantum superposition and entanglement’ because when 
it is in the state of ‘ipseity’, it partly exists in the other state of ‘idem-identity’ simultaneously. Due 
to this entanglement, ‘ipseity’ and ‘idem-identity’ must be described relative to one another. As 
illustrated in figure 1, narratives (i.e. fulcrum) is the point on which the cyborg is supported and on 
which culture (i.e. lever arm) pivots with time. Through narrative, cultural histories become socially 
embodied in the cyborg and embedded in temporality; thus, the cyborg epitomises the 
entanglement of the self and society, subject and object, culture and nature, matter and meaning, 
space and time, history and fiction.  
“This cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (Haraway, 1991, p. 150) as it could 
be read as a history of our present state. I claim that the cyborg utilises narratives to destroy 
naturalised boundaries, subvert phallocentric patriarchies, create new ways of belonging to 
tradition, as well as make sense of her temporal experience and answer the question ‘Who am I? 
“To answer the question ‘Who?’... is to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action 
of the ‘who’. And the identity of this ‘who’therefore itself must be narrative identity” (Ricoeur, 
1988, p. 246).  
 The activity of life through time is enacted in our psychosocial world which provides us 
with a lifetime of existential and material ‘data’that we embody by reflecting on memories, and 
intentions during moments in which the questions, ‘What am I doing?’ and ‘Why am I doing this?’ 
compels us to make sense and meaning “to the primal stew of data which is our daily experience. 
There is a kind of arranging and telling and choosing of detail - of narration” (Rose, 1983, p. 6). 
Accordingly, if the “ ‘first order’ activity of lives as they are lived is mirrored in ‘second order’ 
activities of reflection, representation, accounting and storytelling” (Andrews, 2004, p. 7). The 
question ‘What am I doing?’is then answered in the form a story about ‘why am I doing this?’Our 
answerability takes the form of narratives which could be described as “discourses with a clear 
sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer 
insights about the world and/or people's experiences of it” (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997, p. 
xvi). 
In figure 1, narratives are situated on a ‘chronotope’because they are always told in relation 
to the self and other and in the context of a specific time and place. Bakhtin (1981) coined the 
term ‘chronotope’ translated from the Greek ‘chronos’ (time) and ‘topos’ (place) which means a 
‘moment’ or reality in time-space (that is described by language and literature in particular), or as 
he elucidates: “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are 
artistically expressed in literature [and in life] ... spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one 
carefully thought-out, concrete whole.” (p. 84). 
Constructing a life story or ‘fictive history’ requires imagination when organising and 
interpreting unrelated elements (events, actions, others, contexts) that follow the principles of 
‘emplotment’ in which “sequences of events with beginnings, middles and ends, and generate 
intelligibility by organising past, present and future in a coherent way” (Ricoeur, 1984, 1985, 1988 
as cited in Andrews 2004, p. 7). The notion of narrative identity, which is up bound in time, 
integrate both historical and fictional narrative as lives become more readable or intelligible when 
cyborgs use narrative models or plots from history and fiction to tell life stories (Ricoeur, 1991b). 
Thus, the struggle between sedimentation and innovation that constitutes tradition can be applied 
to our self-understanding (Ricoeur, 1991b). Therefore, cyborgs continually use culture to 
reinterpret their narrative identity. It is thus narrative interpretation that provides “ ‘the figure-
able’character of the individual which has for its result, that the self, narratively interpreted, is 
itself the figured itself –a self which figures itself as this or that” (Ricoeur, 1991a, p. 80). The 
narrative construction of cyborg identity recognises the uniqueness of individual subjects, their 
intimacy with boundaries, and relationality with others, and the inseparability of technology as 
both a cultural fiction and material reality. 
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Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, I have used the elements of a ‘lever’ to portray how the (re)production of a 
phallocratic culture might occur. The dichotomous patriarchal social system in which the 
masculine dominates the construction of meaning has been compared to the mechanical nature 
of a lever. I mapped the positive terms that are associated with the masculine on the dominant 
side of the lever arm that represents the self or ‘effort/meaning making’. Analogously, the 
negative terms that are associated with the feminine were mapped on the side that represents the 
other or ‘resistance’. The intertwining of personal and public histories that form cultural memory 
form the terrain, as represented by a ‘lever arm’, of people’s 'historically effected consciousness' 
(Gadamer, 1982). Narratives, as represented by the ‘fulcrum’, are the point on which culture (i.e. 
lever arm) pivots. I then explicated that through tradition, we inherit prejudices or “fore-
meanings” (Gadamer, 1982) which should be continually subjected to critical examination. 
However, as the masculine dominates the construction of meaning in a phallocratic culture, 
narratives (stories) may be used to assemble varied possibilities of meaning into fixed 
dichotomies, which reproduce binaries. I have argued that this patriarchal social system follows 
the principles of digital computing in that it encodes ‘data’ that are associated with the masculine 
and feminine into binary oppositions. However, the ‘cyborg’ (Haraway, 1991) as a quantum 
machine, can exist in more than one state simultaneously. The cyborg maintains a state of 
‘quantum superposition’ and ‘quantum entanglement’ because when it is in one state of a binary, 
it partly exists in the other state simultaneously. Due to this entanglement, each member of the 
binary is delineated relative to one another. Thus at the centre of this lever, I conceptualised the 
cyborg as it embodies the self as a psychological, socio-material and cultural phenomenon thus 
providing an interpretive entry point to understanding ontology as the entanglement of subject 
and object, space and time, matter and meaning, history and fiction. The cyborg utilises narratives 
to reconstruct identity in the interplay of these dualities. Whereas ‘identity as sameness’ (or idem) 
contains elements of self and other, the interplay between the same and other is ipseity or 
‘identity as self’ (Ricoeur, 1991a). Following Ricoeur (1991b), I assert that ‘self constancy’ offers a 
way out of sameness and otherness because the narrative plot facilitates the mediation of 
permanence and change, which creates a model of “discordant concordance” (p. 32) upon which 
narrative identity may be constructed.  
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Abstract:  
 
In a socially mediatised world, why do some environmental activists movements still think in 
terms of front page newspaper coverage?  The movements’ over reliance on social media as a 
media tactic, over time negated any genuine political strategy.  Environmental activists and the 
traditional media have discovered there is a need to concentrate less on virtual and more on 
physical communities. Activists should concentrate on online tools, to get people off line, just as 
activists should know where and when to use technology.  But, any media tactic is worthless, 
without a political strategy in which to hang it on.  
 
 
 
 
Key words: social media, environmental activists, political strategy 
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“Whenever we think of an action, we envisage what it will look like on the front page” [sic] –Eco-
activists Dan Glass, 2011. 
 
Introduction 
 
In a socially mediatised world, where twitter, Blackberry messaging (BBM), Facebook, the 
Internet, blogs, World Wide Web, open source, Wiki’s and websites can make anyone a producer 
and consumer of news, why do some environmental activists movements still think in terms of 
front page newspaper coverage?  Why engage with traditional1 media (as the quote above shows) 
when there are other ways to influence public opinion?    After decades of viewing journalists and 
media houses as the fourth estate, many contemporary environmental activists now hold a belief 
that “it was a mistake to reject the possibility of strategically using the mainstream media outlets 
to promote our ideas and tackle head-on the discourses of politicians, corporations/recipients of 
such media coverage to think differently outside their own comfort zone” (CSC, 2005:322).  Like 
the direct action that marked out the early days of Greenpeace, post-2005 UK based eco-activist 
collectives such as Plane Stupid, Camps for Climate Action (known as climate camp henceforth), 
So We Stand, Climate Rush, and others are actively engaging with traditional media.   
One example, Plane Stupid, are an eco-activists group that target airport expansion and 
pollution, and are renowned for their media tactics (Doyle, 2009, Gavin, 2009). Their media 
policy had ranged from a television advert with polar bears falling out the sky2;  activists Dan 
Glass super-gluing himself to British Prime Minister, Rt Hon. Gordon Brown, MP (July 22nd 
2008), and  their  activists protesting against a proposed third Heathrow runway, on the roof of 
Westminster Palace (February 27th  2008).  Such actions are in addition to established repertoires 
of contention (direct action, marches, targeting of companies, chaining oneself to inanimate 
objects, climate camps, etc.).  Each action has one objective - front page coverage. Through 
meticulous media tactics, aligned with a protest strategy, collectives such as Plane Stupid design 
deliberate and calculated media tactics that target front page coverage.    
This paper will draw on original empirical data3 with examples from activist collectives 
such as Plane Stupid4, the Camps for Climate Action5; Reclaim the Streets6, VisionON.TV7, 
London Rising Tide8, So We Stand9 and HACAN10 to examine: 1) why have contemporary 
activists developed media strategies that still think in terms of traditional media? 2) What effect 
 
1 This paper will use the term ‘traditional’ media when referring to print and broadcasting journalism. Occasionally 
the term is called mainstream media in quotes, and refers to ‘traditional’ media.  
2 See http://www.planestupid.com/polarbears for more information (accessed January 2012) 
3The method for choosing each participant3 was based on those activists either quoted directly or indirectly by the 
traditional media.   
4 Plane Stupid is a network of grassroots groups that take non violent direct action against aviation expansion ( see 
http://www.planestupid.com/aboutus for more information) 
5 The Camps for Climate change ran from 2006-2010. They were weeklong camps, workshops, and direct action 
aimed at raising awareness about climate change (see http://climatecamp.org.uk/about for further information) 
6 Reclaim the Streets (RTS) were a collective aligned to the rave and free music scene, with an environmental focus. 
7 VisionON dot TV(http://visionon.tv/mission) aims for the widest possible distribution of video for social change 
by creating social media toolkits around this content so that real communities of action can be built. 
8London Rising Tide takes direct action on climate change, to promote ecological alternatives to reliance on fossil 
fuel consumption   
9  So We Stand is an environmental justice collective to support communities living in high emissions areas (for 
example near to power stations or airports), and other areas of environmental injustice. 
10 Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise (HACAN) 
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does front page coverage have on the politics of environmental activism? And 3) does social 
media open-up any opportunities for genuine knowledge exchange between environmental 
activists and journalistic language?  To examine why activists are returning to supplying 
traditional media when they have a plethora of alternative media platforms, this paper will draw 
on the example of the 2007-2010 Climate Camps. The paper is divided into three sections.  The 
first section will examine why activists believed they had to re-engage with traditional media.  The 
middle section looks at the impact of change on relations between journalists and activists. The 
final section examines if there are any consequences of returning to a “media-centrism” (Sobieraj, 
2011:16) strategy, in view of social media and internet developments.  
 
 
Re-engaging with traditional media practices  
 
Early studies (Holloway, 1998, Marshall, 1994) show that during the anti-roads movements some 
activists began “to grow disenchanted and disillusioned with the mass media” (Marshall, 1994).  
Many protestors felt manipulated by journalists to increase the news value of the protest -“They 
very often expect us to perform… for the sake of providing them with a little bit of footage. In 
many cases, I have been to protests where the media even position people saying ‘no, no, no you 
stand over there, this is what you say!” (Marshall, 1994).  Marshall’s finding echo those of Debord 
in his seminal work ‘The Society of the Spectacle’ (2000). Debord notes the objectives of the 
protests are often juxtaposed with an examination of wider social issues. In other words, the 
media use the spectacle of the protest as a counter point to the hegemonies position.   
Whilst some in the Reclaim the Streets collective had “a policy of no contact with the 
media at all…there was officially no contact with the media” (interview with activists Michael), 
others met with journalists from national UK newspapers. This ‘insider-outsider’ distinction 
developed in an earlier period of pressure group politics (Grant, 2005) extends to the relationship 
with traditional media. However, in light of social media, such today’s environmental activists 
understand that a “self-imposed isolation”, a tactic of non-interaction with the mainstream 
media, was a “luxury that we [activists] could not collectively afford” (CSC, 2005:322).   
Hutchins and Lester (2009) show that rather than challenging the protesters’ need for 
access to traditional forms of new media, websites and the web provides an opportunity to 
“bypass corporate, multinational media” and to “become another device in the strategic toolbox 
of the environmental movement for gaining mainstream news media access” (2009:580-581).  A 
simple website is easy to produce and with little need for any “formal organisation behind 
it…used as a node for organising protest campaigns” (Tarrow, 2009:137).  The internet and 
World Wide Web provide an alternative to engaging directly with traditional media.  Access to 
social media means some collectives can return to early media tactics, and still provided a direct 
voice for activists through blogs, websites and citizen journalism. At the climate camps, 
documentary maker, Hamish Campbell at VisionON.tv website encouraged activists to produce 
their own news media.  Anti-aviation expansions collective, Plane Stupid’s communication 
strategy uses websites to provide journalists with direct access to protesters.  Doyle (2009) 
observes how Plane Stupid’s website “constitutes its action…the website is action 
orientated…alongside press releases” (Doyle, 2009:113). For example, during the Westminster 
Palace roof protest, Plane Stupid provided the mobile phone numbers of the activists on their 
homepage.  Thus journalists could speak directly to activists and bypass traditional gatekeeping 
practices.  
The effect is to create “new hybrid forms of media consumption-production which 
challenge the entrenched division on labour (producer vs. consumer of media narratives) that is 
the essence of media power” (Couldry, 2003:45).  For example, the Climate Camp began to 
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create “new hybrid forms of media” with a media tent, a journalist ‘open hour’, and a set of rules, 
to become their own gatekeepers by exploring the “emancipatory and democratizing potential of 
new media technologies” (Hutchins and Lester, 2009:581).  In light of the opportunities to 
bypass traditional media then why do more contemporary collectives actively choose to engage 
with journalists?  
Today environmental activist plan and organise protest as an image event by giving 
reporters direct access to ‘action’ through, their websites homepage, texts, social networks and 
citizen journalism. Yet, despite the open source opportunities, social media means activists can 
circumvent traditional media. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter shows, activists still 
devise tactics and media strategies to gain front page coverage. 
Activists desire to gain front page coverage is a departure from the earlier relationships 
with journalists. The move to engage with journalist is a change from the outright rejection in the 
past, when journalists were predominantly viewed as the fourth estate. As the earlier discussions 
in this paper show with Marshall’s study, activists have purposefully distanced themselves, or felt 
manipulated by traditional media. Indeed, the more anarchic elements of the 2009 summer 
climate camp had ‘No Media’ signs on the outside of their tents, especially the anarchist 
collectives. In general, the climate camps took engagement with journalists’ one step further by 
devising an entire media strategy that became problematic to the movement. The introduction of 
a media team and spokesperson, led to an informal hierarchical structure that shaped power 
structures and divided the camp. There were already tensions in the camp over allowing guided 
tours for journalists. . The internet and World Wide Web may have opened up new media 
platforms, but have also created divisions between the ‘older’ activists and ‘new’ activists.  
Saunders and Price (2009) note “within the [climate] camp, the main tension is between the ideal 
anti-authoritarian self and those more sympathetic to corporate – or state led solutions” (Saunders 
& Price, 2009:118).  Whether to engage or negate the traditional media is a source of division in 
most environmental collectives.  
A media tent and gatekeeping tactics led to the creation of a brand- “climate camp, the 
institution” (Beaumont, 2009:27); and removed any autonomy for the activists as the media team 
became ‘spokespersons’ for the camp. Thus in- engaging with traditional media for front page 
coverage, activists had to accept and engage with traditional media practices, such as a media 
team. Climate camp activists also found that social media created as many problems as the 
publicity it generated. A consequence of such desire for front page coverage was the loss of 
autonomy for the climate camp activists or any acknowledgment of history. 
  
 
The Impact of Change  
 
Front page coverage did generate more column inches, it also removed the  purpose of the 
climate camps and environmental activists’ politics from the media coverage. Wider debates on 
environmental discourse were lost in a language of parties, festivals and ‘youth’. This section 
looks to these consequences of developing media tactics that target the front page.  
The Heathrow climate camp as a “watershed moment” (interview with John, August 
2011) because it highlighted the states and business role in environmental discourse. The second 
climate camp at Heathrow, (2007) was seen by some activists as a successful camp11  
 
 
11 Following the 2010 general election all plans for a third runway were shelved 
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Climate Camp only really had two things that I would call a success.  That’s not to say 
that there weren’t other good things that came out of the two successes of it, and one is 
that, was Heathrow, ‘cos I don’t think any of the other camps, none of them achieved 
their day of actions, none of them were long-lasting, none of them were engaged with the 
local community beyond the actual week of the camp and some of them more likely did 
more damage than good in that sense”.  Erm, and the other thing is that between Drax 
and Kingsnorth, I think it really did transform the discussion and the narrative of media 
around environmental and climate change issues (Nim activists from So We Stand, 
interview August 2011) 
 
 
Yet journalists still depoliticalised the camp as “the cheapest- and chic-est-date in the 
summer festival calendar” (West, 2009:30) as protesters are “nice, white and middle-
class…students who have made their way to Blackheath via a summer of Glastonbury, Inter-
railing, camping in the south of France” (Fryer, 2009), as the camps “looks more like a gentle 
middle-class festival than a political training camp” (Fryer, 2009).   
Consequentially, the front page coverage of the Heathrow Climate camp, led to a wave of 
new activists and interested people that had little interest in the politics of environmental 
discourse. The increased media coverage  did led to front page coverage, but at  the cost of 
objectives, and debates on wider political engagement with environmental discourse.  
Consequentially media tactics that targets front page coverage has in this case resulted in 
a loss of autonomy and objectivity for the protest.   The focus on media attention also led to loss 
of objectives which led to the branding of climate camp 
Social media provides a platform of “horizontal communication networks and 
mainstream media to convey their images and messages” (Castells, 2009:302).  The result is 
environmental activists can “increase their chances of enacting social and political change- even if 
they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources, or symbolic 
legitimacy” (Castells 2009:302).  Contemporary, environmental activists realise there’s a need to 
combine earlier media tactics (i.e. Greenpeace and Greenham Common Peace Camps), with the 
‘‘collective learning via tactical experience” (Anderson, 2004:19). However, activists also realise 
that websites, social media and the World Wide Web is just one solution to influencing media 
coverage.   The web is not a solitary force for mobilising new political forms, but a factor, and 
“success is conditioned by many factors that have little to do with the internet “(Gavin, 
2009:130).  Journalists and activists use of “the web is only trusted as an impartial source by 1 
percent of the population (Worcester & Mortimer, 2001:15), and certainly by fewer than trust the 
conventional media” (Hargreaves and Thomas in Gavin, 2009:132).  
Gavin (2009) observes that if traditional media sees the web as an add-on “an alternative 
transmission mechanism for these media, which are far and away the public’s most trusted and 
most often used source of political information. This perspective sees the web as adjunct to 
conventional sources, rather than as an additional one” (Gavin, 2009:136).  Moreover, in a time-
conscious environment the media, rely heavily on PR sources, and it could be extended to relying 
on protest websites-as “The pressure placed on them [journalists] to produce additional web-
based copy alongside conventional packages – with fewer resources and a in finite amount of 
time- can lead to a dependence on readily available PR sources that, some argue, compromises 
the quality and integrity of the resultant coverage” (Gavin, 2009:136). Thus, the internet and 
various sources on the web “does not in itself constitute usable information, any more than 
usable information constitutes a contribution to knowledge or to rational debate” (Gavin, 
2009:138) 
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Activist have come to realise that in order to influence the front page, they need to 
“concentrate less on online communities and realise that we are communities ourselves …do 
more face-to-face stuff and, whatever means necessary, we are going to go to the actual 
mainstream media” (interview with Steve, august 2011).  It can be used to be a parasite on the 
traditional media, but is equality too limiting in its range of demographics, and who it reaches. 
Hence in aiming for the front pages activists can widen their demographics, move on from ‘the 
converted’ and utilising both repertoire of tactics and new media.  Thus social media should be a 
tool to facilitate a tactics not strategies.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The movements’ over reliance on social media as a media tactic, over time negated any genuine 
political strategy.  Environmental activists and the traditional media have discovered there is a 
need to concentrate less on virtual and more on physical communities. Activists should 
concentrate on online tools, to get people off line, just as activists should know where and when 
to use technology.  But, any media tactic is worthless, without a political strategy in which to hang 
it on.  
The internet has meant activist were  wedded to the spectacle, focusing soley on media 
tactics, and consequently forgoting the objective for much of their protest. Slowly over time as 
Plane Stupid were planning how to superglue Dan Glass to the Prime Minister, or Climate camp 
were busy planning the annual event, it slowly turned into a brand, the very corporate-led 
solutions they were originally protesting about. The focus on the front page meant the movement 
lacked any political discourse or objective to challenge.  Unlike the early movements whose desire 
to protest came ahead of the media strategy. Today’s collectives think of a media strategy first 
and make the protest fit!  As the older activists observe, there needs to be a return to tactics and 
planning, to face-to-face meeting, organised via social media, but not dependent on how many 
hits, tweets or face book ‘likes’ are a measure of success. Doherty  had a valid point, that success 
shouldn't be measured by mediatisation (cited in Seel et al, 2000). Activists need to retain their 
'insider/outsider' distinction through a combination of media tactics and community strategies. 
Despite attempts to avoid the ‘Swampy’ effect, the protest was still a depoliticalisation of the 
climate camps, framing the camps as a brand. In the drive to achieve front page coverage the 
objective of the movement is lost. Environmental activists may think in terms of front page 
reports but as empirical data shows, there needs to a combination of media and a non-media 
strategy, online and off line, media tactics and political strategies.  
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“The Interests of Justice” under the ICC Prosecutor Power:  
Escaping Forward       
 
 
 
 
Farid Mohammed Rashid 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the application of article 53 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which provides the prosecutor with the discretionary power to decline to 
investigate or prosecute, if the ‘interests of justice’ would not be served. First, it will analyse the 
scope of the concept of the ‘interests of justice’. Second, it will consider whether the prosecutor 
should take into consideration alternative justice mechanisms when making the decision. It will 
further investigate whether ‘peace processes’ can be under the consideration of the prosecutor 
when deciding on the ‘interests of justice’.   
This issue is part of my wider research project, which provides an analytical discussion of 
the prosecutorial discretion of the prosecutor. It reflects on the approaches to the relationship 
between international law and politics advanced by Martti Koskenniemi. His theory aims to help 
decision-makers to work objectively whenever a tension arises between concrete and normative 
demands in international legal institution.  
 
 
Key words: International Criminal Court, peace processes, international law, politics 
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Introduction 
The debates about the use of the discretionary power of officials within any legal system always 
raise the question of political influence. This is the case in international law, in general, and in the 
work of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in particular. Article 53 of the Statute of the ICC 
is one of the Statute articles, which raises such concern. Subparagraphs (1) (c) and (2) (c) confer 
on the prosecutor the prerogative to decline an investigation or prosecution in ‘the interests of 
justice’. The article provides the prosecutor with a critical power, which she can exercise in a 
broad discretionary manner.  
The significant aspect of article 53 is driven from two main issues. The first is that, since 
the establishment of the ICC in 2002, the prosecutor has not used her discretion to decline any 
investigation or prosecution in ‘the interests of justice’. Despite the fact that the article has never 
been invoked, there has been much speculation within the Court and beyond about the scope of 
this article. Second, sub-paragraphs (1) (c) and (2) (c) of article 53 raises two main concerns, 
resulting from its non-application and the loose meaning of the term ‘the interests of justice’. 
These concerns are related to questions over what is the scope of the ‘interests of justice’? And 
when can the prosecutor decide not to open an investigation or prosecute a certain situation or a 
case? The next concern is that, if the prosecutor made her decision to decline a situation or a 
case, what other alternative justice mechanisms would be acceptable to the prosecutor? The latter 
concern opens another discussion about whether or not ‘peace processes’ can delay or cease the 
criminal proceedings.      
Much of the current literature indicates concerns about the ability of the prosecutor to 
decline an investigation or prosecution, as they believe that the latter has no such a right.1 
However, other scholars argue that the prosecutor has a power of declination, and that such 
power would be consistent with the Statute.2 My discussion will seek to interpret the scope of 
article 53, which apparently provides the prosecutor with this power, instead of discussing 
whether or not the prosecutor has such a right. It addresses the main problem, raised essentially 
by scholars who want to avoid politically motivated decisions. The paper will argue that the 
prosecutor can decline the proceedings, without being politically-motivated.3 In addressing this 
 
1 Policy Paper: The Meaning of “The Interests of Justice” in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, Human Rights Watch, 
June (2005), available at < http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf>, arguing in favour of 
committing to criminal justice. See also Martin Macpherson, Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court: Comments on the concept of the interests of justice, Amnesty International, June 2005, available at < 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/023/2005>. see also Richard J. Goldstone and and Nicole Fritz, 
‘In the Interests of Justice’ and Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 13, Issue 03 (2000), 655- 667, see also Dražan Djukić, Transitional Justice and the ICC: in the 
‘Interests of Justice’, Centre Universitaire de Droit International Humanitaire (2006), P. 1- 69 June (2005), available at < 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf>, arguing in favour of committing to criminal 
justice.  
2 Henry M. Lovat, Delineating the Interests of Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, bepress Legal Series, Paper, 1435 (2006), See also, Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests 
of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 14 (2003), P 481- 505, see also Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International 
Criminal Court, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2004), 71- 95 
3 These arguments will be presented by depending on the objectivity theory of an international legal discourse, 
advanced by Martti Koskenniemi. This theory provides helpful lens in understanding the exercise of discretion, as his 
complex defense of international law from just being politics is what such an exercise of discretion entails to 
consider. The objective international legal discourse needs two requirements: normativity and concreteness. The 
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issue, I draw on the experience of previous international criminal tribunals, where the prosecutors 
faced the same dilemma in an effort to establish whether any lessons can be learned. I will also 
rely on interviews I conducted with four members of staff of the Office of the Prosecution 
(OTP), as an inductive study that has had shaped my views on several points.4  
 
      
Prosecutorial Discretion under Article 53 
Article 53 first deals with the investigation stage and provides the prosecutor with a power not to 
open an investigation in a certain situation on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’.5 It provides 
two criteria that the prosecutor should consider when making a negative decision: ‘the gravity of 
the crime and the interests of victims’. These criteria do not seem exclusive, as the article 
continues, ‘there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve 
the interests of justice’. The word ‘nonetheless’ indicates that the prosecutor could also consider 
other factors. This can give an implication that the Statute is inclined to adopt a wide 
interpretation of the meaning of ‘the interests of justice’.  
In sub-paragraph (2) (c), the provision also deals with the prosecution stage.6 If the 
prosecutor decides to open the investigation in the given situation, she, then, will move on to the 
prosecution stage and may decide whether or not to prosecute. At this stage, the prosecutor is 
entitled to select cases within the given situation to which the prosecutor has opened the 
investigation. In addition to the above two criteria, this sub-paragraph adds two more criteria that 
the prosecutor is required to consider when making a decision: ‘the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.’ 
The wording of the text implies that the prosecutor may utilize a broad meaning of justice 
when making a decision not to proceed, as the Statute adds two further factors to be balanced. 
As Drazan Djukic expressed, ‘the article speaks of “all the circumstances, including…” (emphasis 
added) which renders the list of factors illustrative instead of exhaustive.’7 However, apart from 
the scope of the prosecutor’s power in defining the scope of the ‘interests of justice’, the article 
subjects the decision not to proceed in ‘the interests of justice’ to the Pre-Trial Chamber, which 
 
normativity of international law assumes that international law should be based on principles and can be applied 
regardless of the subjective will, interest, and behaviour of a state. But in this case, this law, which is regulated and 
not based on actual practices of the state, is merely utopian, as it cannot be verified by reference to the actual practice 
of states. With respect to concreteness, it runs in an opposing way. It assumes that international law should be 
regulated and based in accordance with the actual practice of states in the sense that makes it able to be verifiable by 
reference to the will, interest, and behaviour of a state. But this law, which sets a distance between itself and a natural 
morality, seems mere apology. Koskenniemi opines that we need to balance between these requirements so we can 
come up with objective discourse, see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, the Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
4 I conducted these interviews from 11th to 20th March, 2013.  I followed semi-structured interviews with four 
members of staff of the OTP: Head, International Relations Task Force, OTP, Senior Appeal Counsel, Trial Lawyer, 
and Prosecutor during the trial stage. Each interview took around one hour 
5 The sub-paragraph reads ‘In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: 
Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.’ 
6 The sub-paragraph reads, ‘If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis 
for a prosecution because: A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account 
all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;’ 
7 Supra n. 1, Dražan Djukić, P. 26 
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can review the decision on its own initiative.8 More than that, if the Pre-Trial Chamber dismisses 
the negative decision of the prosecutor, it can oblige the latter to proceed with the investigation 
or prosecution.   
 
 
The Decision’s Timing  
The big challenge in this regard is when are the most appropriate times that the prosecutor can 
apply article 53? Drawing on my initial contact with the Prosecutor and other evidence in the 
public domain, it appears that the OTP would construe the term narrowly and not take into 
account any alternative to the criminal justice system, on the ground that the task of the Court is 
confined to criminal prosecutions.9 The underlying reason behind this policy is the principal 
policy that the OTP has sought to develop. They seek to adopt a zero-tolerance policy against 
perpetrators of serious crimes of concern to the international community and, therefore, put an 
end to the era of impunity. While it seems that such a policy has merit, there is a doubt about its 
success, since, as a matter of fact, such tribunals, however, work within a political environment, 
and exercise their jurisdiction over crimes that also have, to a large extent, political dimensions. 
However, article 53 still provides four circumstances in which the prosecutor might 
decline the ongoing proceedings. It is very important to bear in mind that most of these criteria 
are of a dual nature, and rather, could function in two different ways. The Statute does not show 
how much weight will be given to each factor. However, the OTP in its policy paper on ‘the 
interests of justice’ suggests three basic priorities will be considered when dealing with these 
criteria.10 First is the exceptional nature of ‘the interests of justice’, which supposes that there is a 
presumption in favour of investigation and prosecution, even if the criteria are met. Second, the 
objects and purposes of the Statute will guide the exercise of the discretionary function when 
considering these criteria. Third, the OTP presumed that there is a difference between ‘the 
interests of justice’ and the interests of peace. The latter falls within the mandate of other 
international institutions, in particular the United Nations Security Council. It appears, then, that 
the OTP is inclined to favour the demands of criminal justice ahead of the demands of 
alternative justice.   
 
a. The gravity of the Crime 
The first factor is ‘the gravity of the crime’. The inclusion of the gravity test within this article, 
where the prosecutor has a large discretion, indicates that the gravity concept serves a 
 
8 The Pre-Trial Chamber is an important judicial part of the Court, whose function starts at the early stage of the 
judicial proceedings, when the Prosecutor presents a situation or a case to it, until the confirmation of charges. For 
more information about this body see, ICC, Pre-Trial Division, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/pre%20trial%20division/Pages/pre%20trial%20
division.aspx>   
9 This was Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s answer to my question about the prospects of the application of Article 53. 
She stated that if the current works of the Court disturbed national activities of the given situation, she would 
reconsider her proceedings and apply Article 53. This was during a lecture run by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at 
Birkbeck College on 29 November, 2012. For more information about the other evidence (such as the policy paper 
issued by the OTP), see, Supra n. 1 and 2 
10 ICC, Office of Prosecution, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September, 2007, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09 
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf>, Pp. 3-4 
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discretionary function. 11 This criterion seems to function in two opposite ways. In other words, 
the prosecutor can consider the severity of the situation or the case as a basis for proceeding with 
the investigation or prosecution. This can be deduced from the general priorities that the OTP 
developed for the evaluation of ‘the interests of justice’. On the other hand, the prosecutor may 
use the potential reverse effects of the initiation of the criminal proceedings, as a basis not to 
proceed with the investigation or prosecution. This seems a difficult assessment that the OTP 
might face. However, history has shown over time that there are some particular egregious 
offences, which are so grave in their nature, that should be always prosecuted, whatever the 
consequences of initiating criminal proceedings. The International Tribunal of Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Tribunal for Rwanda’s experiences have demonstrated 
several lessons that the ICC should develop. For example, these Tribunals have sought to 
concentrate on situations and cases that have ‘particular historical resonance, such as the shelling 
of the marketplace in Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre.’12 Although all crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court are serious enough, nevertheless, crimes such as genocide and crimes 
related to sexual violence should be always considered as grave crimes that warrant the attention 
of the Court.13  
 
b. The Interests of Victims  
‘The interest of victims’ is a second factor that the prosecutor can use to stop proceeding with 
either the investigation or prosecution. This particular factor was well established in the practice 
of the ICTY’s jurisprudence. The decision not to indict Slobodan Milosevic on the eve of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, although the latter was allegedly responsible for several serious crimes, 
is an example that showed how Prosecutor Richard J. Goldstone was aware of this particular 
criterion: ‘the interests of victims’.14 This decision was still necessary in order not to make the 
situation of the victims worse. This also shows how ‘the interests of victims’ and ‘the role of the 
perpetrators’ overlapped.  
These interests are often varied across time and geography. While some victims of a 
certain situation might demand that criminal justice be done, ‘others would prefer to bury the 
past’.15 This prospect is highly likely linked to certain circumstances, where several factors can 
shape the demands of those victims. The most preeminent one is the role of the perpetrators in 
the given situation, where they still hold office or military command. For example, those 
perpetrators, by virtue of their strong positions, may oblige the victims to be satisfied with 
peaceful settlements, as a strategy to avoid a criminal justice fate. The absence of conditions, in 
which a criminal trial could be held, such as the lack or the unavailability of effective enforcement 
mechanisms, is another consideration that might make this approach inapplicable. So depending 
on the given factors, the prosecutor is required to determine which demands would be 
considered. The dual nature of this criterion makes the evaluation of this factor by the prosecutor 
 
11 Ignaz Stegmiller, The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Back and Forth in Lubanga and 
Ntaganda, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), Pp. 561-5 
12 Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97 (2003), P. 543 
13 The crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the Court are: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
aggression, see articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the ICC Statute 
14 Slobodan Milosevic was a President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, indicted by the ICTY for several 
international crimes, and died during his trial in 2006 
15 Making Kampala Count: Advancing the Global Fight against Impunity at the ICC Review Conference, Human 
Rights Watch (2010), P. 95, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/05/10/making-kampala-count-0> 
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unpredictable. As the prosecutor is required to protect the victims by bringing justice to them, 
she might decide not to initiate a criminal prosecution. In the latter case, the prosecutor 
sometimes needs to consider any serious bad effect on the victims’ life or dignity that could result 
from the investigation or prosecution.16  
The prosecutor might be required to weigh these factors to adopt a certain strategy; not 
necessarily to stop a prosecution, however. This is exactly what happened in the ICTY’s 
experience, where these two factors played essential role in mapping the strategy of prosecution 
followed by Goldstone, alongside with the then available enforcement mechanisms.17 For 
example, although the position of Milosevic at that time constituted a fundamental reason that 
required Goldstone not to indict him on the eve of the Dayton Peace Agreement, this situation 
was changed later, when the Prosecutor found that his role no longer constituted any risk to the 
interests of victims. The availability of the political wills of powerful states was another critical 
factor that encouraged the Prosecutor, based on the other two factors, to make a case against 
Milosevic.  
Such an overlapping relationship between these criteria requires the prosecutor to 
examine the given situation by considering all details of it, as these interests are ‘by nature a case-
by-case affair’.18 It is not necessary that the prosecutor should decide not to prosecute to save ‘the 
interests of justice’; she can also exercise a comprehensive strategy by depending on the relevant 
circumstances to decide on the issue. For example, the postponement of the decision, as in the 
case of Milosevic, can be one of the strategies that the prosecutor can follow. Thus, even if the 
initiation of investigation or prosecution is not in ‘the interests of justice’, based on the 
examination of ‘the interests of victims’, this does not mean that the prosecutor should make a 
final decision not to proceed. The prosecutor can utilise her power and exercise a comprehensive 
strategy and delay the timing of the decision, based on the given circumstances of the situation or 
case.19   
 
c. The Role of the Alleged Perpetrators  
‘The role of the alleged perpetrators’ is an additional criterion that was mentioned only in the 
context of the prosecution stage, along with ‘the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator’. 
This criterion also can be interpreted by the prosecutor in two opposite ways. While it can be a 
reason for rejecting the case, it also can serve for initiating it. In other words, the duality nature of 
this test leaves the prosecutor with a broad space to decide on the issue. The ICTY again gives an 
example, where remarkably this factor again was tested. For instance, Goldstone indicted Ratko 
Mladic and Radovan Karadzic despite their role at the time of indicting them. There was a fear 
that the indictment of those people might have adverse effects on the then peace negotiations 
and that the prosecutor should consider the positions of those criminals. However, the 
prosecutor believed that the indictments of such people would help to weaken their role in the 
Balkan conflict. And this is exactly what happened. The ICTY’s experience showed first how 
Goldstone first identified these criteria that have been codified now in article 53, on the 
international level, and, second, how these criteria can be used in opposite ways. However, it is 
very important to bear in mind that the political environment at that time was in favour of issuing 
 
16 The English Code for Crown Prosecutors (2013) has mentioned this particular case, see P. 4.12 
17 For more information about prosecution’ strategy of Goldstone, see Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hands of 
Vengeance, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002) 
18 Alexander K. A. Greenwalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal 
Court, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2010), P. 145 
19 An interview with a staff member of the Office of the Prosecution conducted on 12 March, 2012 
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such decisions against those perpetrators, while the same environment was not conducive for 
indicting Milosevic.  
 
d. The Age or Infirmity of the Alleged Perpetrator  
‘The age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator’ seems the clearest factor that is not open to 
various interpretations. Augusto Pinochet’s case is a good example to discuss this factor. 
Although Pinochet was indicted for serious crimes, including crimes against humanity, he never 
stood trial.20 It is true that the Spanish court had already issued the prosecution decision, and later 
on, the full trial processes were completed by British court. However, the trial process was ended 
when Pinochet appealed the decision on the basis of his health condition. Pinochet made two 
appeals, based on his health condition, before the British Home Secretary accepted it.21 The latter 
rejected all appeals on the basis of humanitarian considerations, and decided to complete all 
judicial and appeal processes before making the decision on his health condition. On 8th of 
October 1999, the British Home Secretary, Jack Straw, announced that Pinochet would not be 
extradited, in view of his poor health.22  
This example seems to indicate that the health condition should be interpreted in a narrow 
way. Although Pinochet was in a poor health, the full trial processes took place. Therefore, if 
poor health can exclude the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged perpetrator, that does 
not preclude the prosecutor from the very beginning of the criminal proceedings from 
prosecuting him or her. It is only when the investigative and/or prosecutorial proceedings affect 
the mental or physical health of the alleged perpetrator that the prosecutor should stop the 
proceeding with the trial.23 However, the prosecutor is still able to exercise more than one 
strategy in such situation. The prosecutor, for example, can follow the policy of postponement, in 
the same way that the ICTY dealt with Milosevic's ill-health through adjournments and 
postponements.’24 
 
 
Possible Alternative Justice Mechanisms  
The next concern of the article is whether other alternative justice mechanisms would be 
acceptable to the prosecutor, as an alternative to ICC proceedings. The significance of this 
concern is the current discussions that argue that the prosecutor should not defer the situation or 
case to any alternative mechanism, and should commit only to the criminal justice approach.25 
Advocates of this view developed their arguments on a theoretical basis, which implies that the 
 
20 For information about Pinochet case, see Eamon C. Merrigan, The General and his Shield: the Extradition Process 
Against General Pinochet Ugrate, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 15 (2001), 101- 119 
21 See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte CO/1786/99 (Q.B. 1999), or 
Pinochet Ugarte, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For Home Department [1999] EWHC Admin 505 
(27th May, 1999), Judgmental UK Case Law Made Public, available at < http://judgmental.org.uk/judgments/EWHC-
Admin/1999/[1999]_EWHC_Admin_505.html>  
22 See News Flash: Pinochet Case, Chile’s request to release Pinochet on health grounds: a medical and judicial 
matter, not a political one, Amnesty International, AI INDEX: EUR 45/40/99 (1999), available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/EUR45/040/1999/fr/dad588c0-aedf-447c-978f-
4dd37540c126/eur450401999en.pdf> 
23 see P. 6.5 (g) of the Code 
24 Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion Not to Proceed in the "Interests of Justice", Criminal Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 50 (2005), P. 333 
25 Supra n. 1 and 2 
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retributive justice can serve better to end the era of impunity and violence.26 In addition, they 
exploited the looseness of the meaning of the term ‘interests of justice’ and followed the aims of 
the given institution, as a second source for the interpretation of the norm.27 By following this 
source, they found that the main aim of the ICC is to insist on bringing criminal justice to both 
victims and perpetrators.28 Accordingly, it is the criminal justice approach that the prosecutor 
should consider, when making a decision. The arguments were mainly based on the 
indeterminate meaning of justice, which implies that the wording of the text of the article cannot 
be used to find out the exact meaning of the term. To reply to this inquiry, it seems that the 
interpretation of the wording of article 53 is possible, and can find out what kinds of mechanisms 
the prosecutor can defer to, without resorting to the purposes of the Court that are laid down in 
the preamble of the Court’s Statute.29  
To discuss the above point, we need first to distinguish between the investigation phase 
and the prosecution phase. From a legal point of view, before the prosecutor makes a decision to 
investigate, she first seeks to receive information, and collect evidence, via communications and 
referrals. This early stage of investigation is called a preliminary investigation. Now, the sort of 
decision that the prosecutor can make at this stage is the decision of investigation (investigative 
proceedings). At this stage (investigation stage), the investigative proceedings are not conducted, 
such as identifying alleged perpetrators, exact incidents, victims, the sort of criminal 
responsibility, the link between the incidents and their perpetrators, and bringing witnesses. 
Therefore, if the prosecutor decided to stop the investigation at this particular stage, then, it 
seems that any justice alternative may be acceptable, even if the latter alternative does not include 
any investigative proceeding. This can be deduced from the wording of the text of article 53.30     
Now, the same argument made above can be applied to the second phase: the prosecution 
stage. However, this needs a further explanation. If the prosecutor decided to investigate the 
given situation and then decided not to prosecute any case on the basis of ‘the interests of 
justice’, different mechanisms would be relevant. At the prosecution stage, it seems again that the 
criterion ‘the interests of justice’ might be used to cease a prosecution, but not an investigation. 
The prosecutor, at this stage, completed the investigative proceedings and declined to prosecute 
any case. This means that the prosecutor, at this stage, can defer to other mechanisms that do not 
involve prosecutorial decisions. However, the alternatives do need to involve investigative 
proceedings. Therefore, the prosecutor should be strict, at this particular stage, when interpreting 
the term of ‘justice’. For example, a truth commission approach, in its narrow meaning, which 
involves investigative proceedings and not the decision to prosecute, may be an acceptable 
 
26 They found that the Preamble of the ICC Statute emphasises the necessity of providing criminal justice to both 
victims and perpetrators of any conflict, see supra n. 1 and 2 of the views of those authors 
27 They used Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which set out the general sources of the 
interpretation of treaties. These sources are in order. The second one is that, if the wording of the text is not clear, 
then, the main aims and goals of the given treaty can be utilised 
28 For example, Paragraph 4 of the Preamble of the Statute provides that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished’ 
29 Most of the scholarships and some international human rights organisations have initially argued against any 
decision that might stop the proceedings in ‘the interests of justice’. Basically, the latter views were based on the lack 
of clarity of the phrase: ‘the interests of justice’ that is open for different interpretations. This pushed them to 
exclude the wording text to interpret the exact meaning of the phrase and use other sources, such as the aims of the 
Court, to build their views, See supra n. 1 and 2 to know further information about the arguments presented by those 
groups 
30 Public apologies, reparatory justice, National Remembrance Day, administrative justice, constitutional justice, 
historical justice, and peace process are some examples that can be relevant alternatives, as they, sometimes, might 
not involve any investigative or prosecutorial process or they might result from non-investigative mechanisms 
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alternative. The truth seeking approach is the ideal approach that refers to the process of 
investigation and does not end up with any prosecution decision. Ultimately, if the above 
interpretation is correct, then one can say that the first part of article 53 should be read in a broad 
way, but the second one in a narrow way. In other words, the discretionary function looks more 
significant at the prosecution stage than the investigation stage.  
 
 
Is Peace Process within the Scope of ‘the Interests of Justice?’  
A third concern of article 53 is whether or not peace processes can be taken into account. Can 
the latter prospect come within the parameters of the broad meaning of ‘justice’? Basically, the 
Prosecutor, the policy paper on ‘the interests of justice’, and most commentators have answered 
no.31 However, the previous Prosecutor32 and the incumbent one33 seem inconsistent, as both 
have answered that they would consider the impact of the proceedings on national efforts to 
achieving peace on some other occasions.  
To find out whether peace talks come within the confines of justice, we need to look at 
article 53, the policy paper on ‘the interests of justice’, and my own data, which I collected by 
interviewing members of staff of the OTP. Obviously, the wording of the text of the article does 
not make any reference to peace processes. However, the balancing test that article 53 provides 
might merit an examination of the position of peace within the article. Among the factors that 
the article suggests are ‘the role of the alleged perpetrator’ and ‘the interests of victims’. These 
factors, as was explained above, have a dual nature in the sense that they are open to different 
interpretations. Having looked at history, one can see that these factors were taken into 
considerations when handling certain situations.34 In other words, it seems that these factors may 
be used as bases to defer to peace negotiations, as will explained now.   
In order to discuss this point in more detail, we need first to distinguish between stable 
and unstable situations, whether be it during ongoing conflicts or post-conflicts. During stable 
situations, criminal prosecution may become a desirable option. This happens, essentially, in 
situations, where the alleged perpetrators have been defeated, and have had no further role in the 
given society. The perpetrators usually cease to hold power and can be apprehended with no fear 
of the renewed explosion of violence. The prosecutor can then ignore this criterion (the role of 
the alleged perpetrators) and, therefore, proceed with the investigation of prosecution. “The 
 
31 ‘‘I cannot adjust the law to the political interests. Those who manage political agenda have to respect the law’’, An 
answer of Moreno Ocampo to my own question about the application of Article 53 run via a webcast interaction. 
See this interview at: Webcast interview with ICC's former Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, International 
Bar Association, 17, October, 2012, at 
<http://wcc.webeventservices.com/eventRegistration/console/EventConsoleMVC.jsp?&eventid=529206&sessioni
d=1&username=&partnerref=&format=fhvideo1&mobile=false&flashsupportedmobiledevice=false&helpcenter=f
alse&key=47F980F3BD93A69C4C205D63E8B92504&text_language_id=en&playerwidth=800&playerheight=690&
eventuserid=70917034&contenttype=A&mediametricsessionid=56952751&mediametricid=963054&usercd=70917
034&mode=launch#> (Last Access: 10, October, 2012) 
32 See ICC, the Office of the Prosecution, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr 
Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005) (13th December, 2005), P. 7, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2CFC1123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF4-
52E0CAC8AA79/0/LMO_UNSC_ReportB_En.pdf> 
33 Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s answer to my question about the prospects of the application of Article 53, where 
she stated that if the current work of the Court disturbed national activities on the given situation, she would 
reconsider her proceedings and apply Article 53. This was during a lecture run by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at 
Birkbeck College on 29 November, 2012 
34 Ibid 
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interests of justice” during the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were best promoted by simply 
delivering criminal justice to the perpetrators, who were not any longer in power. The same can 
be applied to the Rwanda situation, where the defeat of genocidiers made the criminal justice 
response an ideal mechanism to deal with the post-conflict transition without a fear about “the 
interests of justice”.  
Things look different when it comes to talk about unstable situations, however. Indeed, 
there are several historical examples that demonstrate that a variety of justice mechanisms 
(criminal and non-criminal mechanisms) have been applied to such situations (unstable 
situations).35  However, there was a common shared feature that shaped this situation, where the 
political and military strategies articulated to end the violence or to boost the fragile peace 
processes played essential roles in the eventuality of prosecution on peaceful transitions. In other 
words, articulating “the interests of justice” was, to a large extent, affected by the accompanying 
political and military circumstances. For example, one of the worst atrocities that was committed 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Srebrenica massacre by Mladic, happened only two years after the 
establishment of the ICTY.36  
When the perpetrators of this massacre and other crimes, such as Karadzic, no longer 
held power, Goldstone developed his strategy and, accordingly, decided to indict those 
perpetrators, as there would be no further atrocity or threat to the ongoing peace talks.37 This 
happened on the eve of the Dayton Peace Agreement, when Goldstone indicted only Karadzic 
and Mladic, and totally ignored Milosevic, who was still needed for the process of the Dayton 
talk.38 It was only after the NATO intervention in Kosovo that made Milosevic no more 
dangerous for any violent backlash (interests of victims).39 The latter environment, which 
obviously had political considerations, provided an ideal opportunity for the hunter to hunt his 
prey. These critical cases are examples that demonstrated that the pragmatic considerations were 
needed for a better strategy on a prosecutorial discretion. Further, considering these accounts was 
apparently a part of the decision-making process that provided the Prosecutor with a wide space 
to move without prejudice to the independence of the Prosecutor, as a body within a judicial 
institution.  
The same argument could be applied to the Darfur situation, where the prosecution 
approach may have resulted in increasing the level of suffering (interests of victims), and those 
who were indicted by the ICC and are still in power have still been committing war crimes.40 
 
35 El Salvador and Haiti adopted non-criminal mechanisms, while Uganda, Sierra Leone and Rwanda and Former 
Yugoslavia adopted a criminal approach 
36 See supra n. 17. Here, I am linking the crimes committed in Balkan wars to the establishment of the tribunal, as this 
was not all the time a case. Hazan said that ‘The UN peacekeeping forces present in the former Yugoslavia reported 
that the warring parties took account of the legal risk during the first few weeks after the creation of the ICTY in 
1993. They later realized that the Tribunal was weak and, confident of impunity, committed the Srebrenica 
massacres.’ According to this statement, there was a link between the crimes committed and the establishment of the 
tribunal, at least, at the beginning of the conflict, see Pierre Hazan, Measuring the Impact of Punishment and 
Forgiveness: a Framework for Evaluating Transnational Justice, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 861 
(2006), P. 35 
37  Supra n. 17 Bass, Pp. 227-30 
38 Ibid P.237 
39 The NATO war in Kosovo changed the priorities of the war strategies, where Milosevic was considered to be an 
obstacle to the stability of the region, as he began to lose his power. Then, the political and military environment was 
ideal for the Prosecutor to indict him as “the interests of justice” were not at risk any more 
40 When the President of Sudan was indicted by the Prosecutor, who ignored calls by the Arab League, the African 
Union, several African States, and China not to indict him, Omer Al-Bashir responded to this indictment by 
suspending the operation of aid groups, which left thousands of people in Darfur, including IDPs with no life 
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However, there is a preeminent difference between Darfur and Yugoslavia, which is the 
enforcement problem. In the ICTY situation, despite the fact that the Prosecutor still used his 
discretion to select his targets in the most relevant circumstances, the Prosecutor was acting 
within an environment where effective enforcement mechanisms were available.41 This, first, 
pushed the decision-makers to approach a criminal prosecution mechanism as a de facto approach 
to address the conflict. Second, it allowed the Prosecutor to use his discretion in a more 
convenient way, as the prospects of arresting the potential indictees were relatively high.  
In the Darfur situation, the enforcement mechanisms are not effective, and the political 
environment is not helpful for the OTP, as most African states are against the policy of the OTP, 
in particular in the Darfur situation.42 Further, all indictees of the Sudanese Government are still 
at large. Hence, the prosecutor decided not to apply article 53 and indicted the most responsible 
for committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, including the President of Sudan, 
although an effective enforcement mechanism is not available.43 The SC’s resolution referring the 
Darfur situation to the ICC did not provide any serious mechanisms for enforcing the decision.44 
In addition, the ICC entirely depends on the political will of states in enforcing its decisions. The 
consequences of this strategy were the failure of any peace process taken to end the conflict and a 
noticeable growth in the level of violence since the prosecution and indictment decisions against 
Sudan and those who are still in power, respectively.45  
This does not mean at all that the Prosecutor should not have indicted the President; 
instead he could have exercised a better strategy if he had considered these pragmatic 
considerations. It is true that considering these accounts does not necessarily guarantee the 
capture of the alleged perpetrators. However, such a strategy, at least, gives a better chance of 
arresting the fugitives. In other words, bringing the political idea of justice within the legal 
framework of the ICC by emphasising the discretionary power of the prosecutor can help to 
exercise a better strategy. For example, he could consider the strong role and position of the 
President and, therefore, decide not to prosecute him until he has built the case against him when 
the pragmatic considerations are available.  
 
services, see Kate Allan, Prosecution and Peace: a Role for Amnesty before the ICC? Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, Vol. 39, No.1 (2011), Pp. 275-6  
41 The existence of NATO, and the effective supports that were given to the ICTY by the then Governments of the 
fighting states were some available tools at the time, see more supra n. 17 
42 Most recently, the Chad Government refused to arrest the President of Sudan, who visited the country recently, 
although Chad is party to the ICC and has an obligation to transfer the President to the ICC, see Chad: Hosting once 
again President al-Bashir would be a further insult to the victims of Darfur, No Peace Without Justice (8th April, 2013), 
available at <http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Chad-should-stand-justice-and-not-grant-impunity-President-al-
Bashir.html-0> (Last Access: 12th May, 2013) 
43 There are huge concerns about the public nature, benefit, seriousness, and time of the indictment of President of 
Omar Al-Bashir, as such indictment has only accelerate the rhythm of the violence in Darfur, where people are in 
desperate need of humanitarian assistance as a consequence of the indictment, see Conor Foley, This Darfur 
Prosecution is deadly, The Guardian (27, May, 2009), available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/27/hay-festival-icc-darfur-sudan> (Last Access: 24, 
November, 2012). See also, James A. Goldstone, More Candour about Criteria, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
Vol. 8 (2010), P. 385 
44 UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) 
45 Supra n. 36, Hazan, P. 35, talking about how the warring parties to the Darfur conflict took the ICC’s prosecution 
into account when committing further crimes. This argument was also asserted by a participant to a Regional 
Consultation Conference held in South-Africa, see Tim Murithi and Allan Ngari, The ICC and Community-Level 
Reconciliation: In-country Perspectives Regional Consultation Report, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Transitional 
Justice in Africa Programme, (21st and 22nd February, 2011), available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/IJR_ICC_Regional_Consultation_Report_Final_2011.pdf> 
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Thus, the reference to pragmatic considerations does not necessarily prevent the prosecutor from 
making a decision to prosecute a certain perpetrator at all. Instead, it provides her with more 
options, so she can exercise a better prosecutorial strategy, based on the available options. This 
also reveals that the prosecutor at this stage is not politically-motivated, as the above strategy 
comes within the confines of the discretionary power. This is how Kenneth A. Rodman argued 
when he talked about the relationship between pragmatic and legal considerations by saying 
‘those episodes (the latter considerations) demonstrate that political factors -most notably the 
power of the perpetrators relative to the forces arrayed against them and the political strategies of 
the latter to address the conflict- determine when a criminal law approach is effective and 
whether it contributes to peace.’46 However, sometimes, in particular, during a point where the 
alleged perpetrators are still holding significant power or retain remarkable power, the prosecutor 
might consider ‘some compromises with criminal justice’.47 This is a critical point, which it seems 
that the OTP would not consider, as the latter is quite strict about the policy of bargaining 
paradigm, where the perpetrators might use to simply avoid any criminal justice fate.  
Then, how would the prosecutor behave in such circumstances? Is not the decision to 
refer to peace processes within the confines of justice (In its broad meaning)?48 The probable 
answer to this inquiry is to know as to whether or not the victims seek the demands of peace 
ahead of the demands of justice. If that is so, then we can say that the decision to defer to what 
victims ask for is what justice is. This is not an easy hypothesis, since; first, the perpetrators might 
impose their conditions on victims as a bargaining chip for their freedom. Second, it is quite 
difficult to identify the real needs of victims. However, the policy paper that the OTP issued 
about the interests of justice has made it very clear that the application of subparagraphs (c) of 
article 53 is exceptional in nature.49 This is also how several staff of the OTP answered my 
inquiry about the general application of article 53, where all of them confirmed that the OTP is 
extremely strict about the application of this article.50 However, the exceptional nature of ceasing 
criminal proceedings requires additional and external responses so the OTP can exercise and 
insist on the criminal prosecution. It ‘requires a commitment by international and regional actors 
to assume those risks’, as the threats posed by the alleged perpetrators are usually 
‘proportionately greater’ and imminent.51 The availability of the latter support might also affect 
the decision of the prosecutor.  
In short, the evaluation of the potential consequences of the decision of investigation or 
prosecution on the ongoing conflict or a political transition is a matter of policy and definitely 
not law. Basically, the Prosecutor is a legal body and has nothing to do with diplomatic and 
political affairs. But that does not mean that the prosecutor might ‘act as both lawyer and 
diplomat in exercising his discretion, evaluating not only the gravity of the crime and the 
admissibility of the case, but also the likely impact of an investigation or prosecution on 
 
46 Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Issue 01 (2009), P. 101 
47 Ibid P. 110 
48 It should be borne in mind that when the OTP decides to stop proceeding with the investigation or prosecution, 
the particular form of alternative would not be very important, according to an interview I conducted with a member 
staff of the OTP on 12 March, 2013. Basically, the concept of justice has broad and narrow meanings. The first 
consists of retributive, restorative, and reparatory justice, while the narrow one consists of only retributive justice. 
For more information about the meaning of justice see, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing Challenge of 
Truth Commissions (New York, Routledge: 2002), and The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. S /2011/634, 12 October 2011, at P. 17  
49 Supra n. 1 
50 Several interviews with members staff of the OTP conducted on 12, 14 of March, 2013 
51 Supra n. 46, P. 115 
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prolonging a conflict or undermining a political transition.’52 In other words, the prosecutor 
sometimes might be in contact with the domestic, regional and international actors who are 
involved in the peace transition for the purposes of examining of the probable effects of criminal 
proceedings on the given situation.53 This is without any prejudice to the independence of the 
prosecutor, as the above strategy is under the discretionary power of the prosecutor. Under this 
power and the above factors, the prosecutor might consider the domestic approach and, 
therefore, might delay any criminal proceeding or just decline totally the investigation or 
prosecution. Such decisions are made on a case by case basis, where the prosecutor is required to 
examine all legal, political, and diplomatic and any other relevant aspect of the situation, bearing 
in mind the exceptional nature of application of article 53.  
The Uganda situation was among the first situations that raised the issue as to whether or 
not the peace process should be taken into prosecutorial discretion, in particular under article 53. 
Following the acceptance of Ugandan Government’s referral in 2005, some people, including 
Betty Bigombe, a former Uganda minister, some NGOs, and the Acholi community, criticized 
this referral, as they believed that the referral would disturb the peace talks. The Court decided to 
indict several alleged perpetrators from only the rebels’ side (LRA), including Joseph Kony who 
was mainly responsible for serious crimes committed against the Acholi community. While this 
conflict is still in progress, the Government of Uganda has led several initiatives to end the 
conflict by having a peace negotiation with Kony.54 The latter has refused several times to sign 
any peace talk until the ICC withdraws the arrest warrant issued against him in 2005.55 As a 
consequence, the Ugandan Government has provided a variety of alternatives to all perpetrators, 
ranging from blanket amnesty to punishment procedures against only those who committed the 
most serious crimes, without clarifying what kinds of punishments they are.56 However, the 
dilemma of justice and peace in the context of Uganda situation is still unclear, as both sides are 
still fighting each other on the one hand and seeking for a peaceful solution on the other.57 The 
question is how the prosecutor should respond to this situation. 
To accept the peace process as a solution to handling the Uganda situation according to 
article 53, is only to accept that the peace process can come within the confines of ‘the interests 
of justice’. The legal justification for such a suggestion is to factor the peace process into the 
decision-making process when the prosecutor evaluates the given situation based on her 
discretionary power. The objectivity theory advanced by Koskenniemi offers an essential 
theoretical justification to reflect on the Uganda situation. He stated that an international legal 
discourse (a decision-making) that is based on the pragmatic and legal considerations is an 
 
52 Supra n. 46, P. 121 
53 An interview with a member staff of the OTP conducted on 12 March, 2013 
54 Situation in Uganda, The Hague Justice Portal, available at <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6175> 
(Last Access: 2, April, 2013) 
55 See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 
56 See Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the 
Lord's Resistance Army/ Movement, Juba Sudan, ICC-02/04-01/05-352-AnxA 18-11-2008 2/12 CB PT, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc589232.pdf>, see also another agreement in 2008 about cease-fire, 
Uganda and Rebels Sign Cease-Fire, The New York Times (24 Feb, 2008), available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/africa/24uganda.html?_r=0> (Last Access: 26, March 2013) 
57 Both sides also signed another agreement on 2009; see Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring 
Mechanisms, Juba, Sudan, available at <http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/images/vy0hCC-
lHclHmwkfQyIbPQ/agendaitem6signed.pdf>. See also, Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda, Uganda: Impact of the 
Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, International Center for Transitional Justice (May, 2010), available at 
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf>, P. 2    
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objective discourse.58 With respect to the pragmatic accounts, it is submitted that several 
pragmatic factors require the prosecutor to consider the peace efforts that have been called for by 
the main parties to the conflict. For example, the voice of victims is one important account, 
where several surveys have shown that a large number of them demanded the peace efforts ahead 
of justice demands.59 The role of the civil society, NGOs, and other domestic actors, who are 
closely engaged in the conflict and strongly believe in a peaceful solution, is another pragmatic 
factor. This can be followed by the strong position of the rebels, who are still holding a strong 
power, as Kony, for example, has refused to sign any peace talk and, therefore, end the conflict 
until the Court withdraws the arrest warrants issued against his groups. On legal considerations, 
the prosecutor may consider two criteria provided by article 53 as bases to stop the proceedings 
against the given situation: ‘the interests of victims and the role of the alleged perpetrator’. The 
consideration of the latter legal requirement alongside the pragmatic ones seems a possible 
approach towards handling the atrocities on the one hand, and on the other, avoiding the 
suspicion that the prosecutor is politically-motivated when considering those pragmatic accounts.   
 
Conclusion  
This paper sought to identify the potential prospects of the application of article 53. It showed 
that the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion in the context of evaluating ‘the interests of the 
justice’ should be based, at the most relevant circumstances, on legal and policy considerations. 
The two latter should be balanced in a way that enables the prosecutor to exercise a better 
strategy of prosecution that can help to give more effect to such a strategy, or find a better 
solution that corresponds with the national efforts to address the given situation. Therefore, the 
prosecutor, sometimes, needs to factor other concrete considerations, which are necessary for the 
exercise of the discretionary function. The unavailability of effective enforcement mechanisms 
obliges the prosecutor to defer her criminal proceedings and use a broad strategy when assessing 
the meaning of ‘justice’. Until our global society finds more credible and effective tools, we need 
to accept both faces of article 53. By then, it could be possible to change the whole argument and 
to argue for the sole commitment to a criminal justice approach. It, finally, showed that the 
prospect of the influence of the prosecutor’s decision, based on her discretionary power, by 
pragmatic considerations is inevitable.           
 
 
 
58 The Koskenniemi’s theory is not taken for granted. His theory was criticised by a variety of sources, including 
realism theory and positivism theory, and from within critical legal theory such as Dencho Georgiev. He critised the 
approach of the arguments that Koskenniemi used to produce an objective international legal discourse, see Dencho 
Georgiev, Politics or the Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1993), 1- 14.  I also criticised him by developing a balance approach between the 
requirements of the objectivity of an international legal discourse, which I placed in my wider PhD project (Chapter 
1)  
59 For example, two surveys conducted by a group of researchers in 2005 and 2007 showed that the responses of the 
affected societies are far from uniform. The first one demonstrated that most of the respondents support the 
criminal prosecution rather than peace talks, while the second survey showed the reverse, see Phuong Pham, Patrick 
Vinck, Marieke Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di Giovanni, Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of 
Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda, International Centre for Transitional Justice (July, 2005), available 
at <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-HRC-Uganda-Voices-2005-English.pdf>. See also, Phuong Pham, 
Patrick Vink, Eric Stover, Marieke Wierda, Andrew Moss, and Richard Bailey, When the War Ends: A Population-
Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda, Human Rights Center: 
UC Berkeley (January, 2007), available at <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8m56w3jj#page-2> 
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Survey Protocol for Research on ‘Vulnerability to Poverty: Insurance Role of 
Microsavings against Crises in Two Villages in Northeast Rural Bangladesh’ 
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Abstract: This protocol is a systematic narration of my fieldwork in Bangladesh for postgraduate 
research at the School Social Sciences, University of East London. Main aim of the research is to 
investigate crises coping strategies of households and insurance role of microsaving in reducing 
vulnerability to poverty in north eastern rural Bangladesh. Underlying research question is: How 
do rural people strengthen their capacity against vulnerability and how microsavings contribute in 
this process? There are three broad data requirement categories for this question: 1) Vulnerability 
to poverty 2) Crises management capacity and 3) Insurance role of microsavings. Data collection 
methods are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Qualitative method uses Participatory 
Rapid Appraisal (PRA) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Quantitative method employs semi-
structured questionnaire and Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) for each randomly selected 
households. The survey was held in two randomly selected villages in north eastern region of 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
 
Key words: vulnerability, poverty, coping strategies, households, Bangladesh 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) organize the 
rural poor and provide development inputs such as microfinancial support, health and education 
programs for capacity building of the households in rural Bangladesh. Unlike banks, MFIs 
provide collateral free semi-formal microfinancial instruments to support their microenterprise 
and provide security against socioeconomic crises and shocks. They provide self-insurance 
products like microsaving and microcredit as well as insurance products like microinsurance and 
other social safety nets. This research is designed to study saving behaviour in northeast rural 
Bangladesh in view of their preferences and expectations in microsavings services provided by 
the MFIs. It would highlight on crisis management capacity of the rural households and potential 
use of microsavings in combating such crises. Focal point of the study is the insurance role 
microsavings against crises facing rural households in north eastern Bangladesh. This 
investigation will examine the capacity building mechanism of rural households rather than 
assessing the impact of MFI programs targeting poverty reduction. 
Main objective of the study is to investigate the crises management capacity of households and 
the effectiveness of microsaving instruments in reducing vulnerability to crises in northeast rural 
Bangladesh.  Its specific objectives are to: 
• Investigate the socioeconomic factors responsible for risks and shocks driven 
vulnerabilities of  households in north eastern rural Bangladesh. 
• Analyse the livelihood condition and coping strategies of rural households facing the 
crises.  
• Explore perception and preferences of rural poor about the insurance role of 
microfinance.  
• Examine the effectiveness of microsavings as insurance against vulnerability to poverty. 
Major emphasis of the study would be the potential role of microsavings in capacity building of 
the rural poor. Underlying research question is: How do rural people strengthen their capacity 
against vulnerability and how can microsavings contribute in this process? Key questions this 
research sought to address are: 
• What are the socioeconomic factors that generate vulnerabilities of households in north 
eastern rural Bangladesh regarding risks and shocks? 
• What types of strategies do rural people use to cope with these crises? 
• How effective are microsaving instruments in building resilience to risks and shocks? 
 
Data required to find answer to these questions are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. 
Mixed method of qualitative and quantitative approaches known as Q-squared approach is used 
to justify the findings of this study. Key elements this research are: assessment of capacity 
building of poor households, utilization of microsavings as insurance against shocks, reducing 
vulnerability to poverty using saving-led asset based approach instead credit-driven liability based 
approach and self-reliant instead of aid-dependent microfinance.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Objective measures of poverty depend heavily on the quantitative information contained in 
household survey on expenditure or income to draw an arbitrary line separating poor from non-
poor. There are three most commonly used poverty measures in development economics 
literature: 1) Incidence of poverty (head count index), 2) depth of poverty (poverty gap) and 3) 
severity of poverty (squared poverty gap). Statistical formulae are heavily used in these 
measurements to assess the wellbeing of the households (Ravallion, 1994, Haughton and 
Khandker, 2009). Social scientists have been debating over the issue of income or expenditure 
deprivation as an appropriate yardstick to measure poverty during 1930s and 1990s. It gains 
momentum when Sen redefines poverty as deprivation of human capabilities in his seminal book 
Development as Freedom (Sen, 1999). The idea of subjective or qualitative measures of poverty based 
on people’s perceptions about their situation and judgement of minimum standard and basic 
needs comes to forefront in early 2000s. Qualitative assessment allow poor to define poverty 
using Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) based on the idea that ‘they are true poverty 
expert’ so their voice should be included (Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000). Poverty measurement is 
now a multidimensional approach that includes all types of deprivation, insecurity, powerlessness 
and social exclusion. Two aspects of poverty emerged from the participatory assessments that are 
not covered in the conventional surveys: first, a concern about risk and volatility of income i.e. 
feeling of vulnerability and the second, lack of voice and socio-political rights i.e. sense of 
powerlessness (Kanbur and Squire, 2001). Poverty measures are generally fixed in time and thus 
poverty is essentially a static concept. By contrast, vulnerability is more dynamic concept that 
incorporates expected poverty i.e. probability of moving in and out of poverty (Lipton and 
Maxwell, 1992).  
 
There are two dimensions of vulnerability: sensitivity or magnitude of a system’s response to an 
external event and resilience or capacity of a system’s recovery from stress (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987; Bayliss-Smith, 1991). Robert Chambers describes vulnerability as a symptom of poverty 
which means defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to risk, shocks and stress. According to 
him, “vulnerability has [thus] two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual or 
household is subject; and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without 
damaging loss” (Chambers (1989, p.1). External sources of risk range from natural disasters and 
epidemics to crime and violence, financial insecurity, and civil conflicts. The author distinguishes 
poverty reduction by raising income and consumption from vulnerability reduction by making 
people more secure. Moser (1998) prefers using the term ‘resilience’ (or capacity to resist or 
recover) instead of Chambers’ ‘defencelessness’. Resilience refers to using assets and entitlements 
as means of resistance against shocks. More ownership and control over assets means less 
vulnerable the households or individuals are (assets based approach). On the other hand 
defencelessness has implicit meaning of seeking help from external sources (loans etc. in liability 
approach) which may end up with indebtedness or higher degree of insecurity. 
 
Morduch (1994) tries to connect two well-developed notions in economics: Poverty and 
Uncertainty. He shows poverty-vulnerability linkage through the equation y = x + ε, where 
current income (y) depends on permanent income (x) and transitory shocks (ε). He argues that 
vulnerability and poverty reinforce each other and diminish expected welfare of the poor. In 
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exploring the linkage between poverty and vulnerability Dercon (2006) focuses on risk-related 
vulnerability instead of defencelessness of vulnerable groups. Such groups may face risks but 
their defining characteristics are not related to risk. The author argues that coping mechanism is a 
central part of people’s livelihood. He recommends ex-ante and ex-post policies for reducing risk 
and supporting capacity building. Ex-ante measures are precautionary measures taken before the 
occurrence of the shocks such as insurance. Ex-post measures are for those who are already 
affected and uninsured e.g. targeted or conditional transfers to the poor.      
 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Data Requirement: There are three major data requirement categories for this survey: 1) 
Vulnerability to poverty, 2) Crises management and 3) Insurance role of microsavings. For the 
first category, poverty likelihood as a proxy for vulnerability can easily be calculated by Progress 
out of Poverty (PPI) Scorecard developed by Grameen Foundation (Grameen, 2008). It includes 
10 simple questions carefully selected from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES) of Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. In-depth vulnerability measurement will be done 
using data from income and expenditure section of the questionnaire. Data required for the 
second and third categories include types of crises, resilience and coping strategies of the poor, 
sources and uses of microfinance, and insurance role of microsavings against vulnerability to 
poverty. These data were gathered by Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and survey questionnaire. 
Quick and cost effective instruments like PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) and PPI were used 
to back up information gathered by focus group discussion and survey questionnaire. Moreover, 
the risk of low response was mitigated by these two interesting, participatory and effective data 
collection methods. 
 
Data Sources: Primary data are obtained from randomly selected households from two sample 
villages in north eastern Bangladesh. Respondents are clients of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
and other formal and informal financial service providers. Other primary sources of information 
include officers and fieldworkers in MFIs, and other service providers such as moneylenders, 
rural doctor and member of local government. Secondary data are obtained from a review of 
literature on microfinance and risk and vulnerability in rural area. Annual reports of major MFIs, 
Statistical Year Book of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) are other major sources of 
secondary data. 
 
Sample Design 
Sampling Frame: Sampling frame is a list of individuals, households or agents within a population 
who can be sampled. Current research project is about vulnerability to poverty assessment and 
risk and crises coping strategies of rural households with special focus on microsavings. The 
population of this study is the total number of households in two randomly selected villages in 
north eastern region of Bangladesh. It can be divided into subgroup of households such as ultra-
poor, poor and non-poor based on specific inference about their poverty status. Sample frame 
was drawn from these sub-groups using appropriate sampling technique. There are two major 
sampling techniques in statistical analysis: 1) Probability sampling where every unit of population 
has a chance of being selected and 2) Non-probability sampling where some elements of 
population have very negligible or no chance. In order to avoid the risk of exclusion bias or 
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selectivity bias I use probability sampling which has various types such as 1) Simple random 
sampling, 2) Systematic random sampling, 3) Stratifies sampling, and 4) Cluster or multistage 
sampling. In this study, I use stratified sampling method where each subgroup or stratum is 
classified as an independent sub-population and then individuals or households are randomly 
selected from the specific sub group.       
 
Sample Size: North eastern part of Bangladesh is known as Sylhet Division which has four 
districts: Sylhet, Moulovibazar, Habiganj and Sunamganj. Geographically, the north eastern 
Bangladesh has two main topographies: 1) High lands with high plains, hills and hillocks locally 
known as Ujan and Pahar or Tilla areas. 2) Low lands with flood plain and free water wetlands 
locally known Bhati and Haor or Beels. I have selected two remote villages from each of the region 
at random. One of the criteria for remoteness is the distance from the urban area that ensures the 
true characteristics of rural life. I assume that it is no less than 10 kilometres from of district town 
or 5 kilometres from local government offices. For each village I used stratified random sampling 
method for identifying sample households. By PRA wealth ranking exercise villagers classified 
their households into three strata: ultra-poor, poor and non-poor. From each stratum 35 
households were selected randomly giving 35 X 3 = 105 households in each village and 105 X 2 
= 210 households in total sample. Each household was surveyed by using PPI scorecard and 
semi-structured questionnaire. Respondents in each village participated in six PRA exercises 
(transects, social map, seasonal calendar, wealth ranking, mobility map and pairwise ranking) and 
seven FGDs (3 poverty groups, 3 MFIs field officers groups and one other service provider 
group). Participants in PRA are residents of the village, irrespective of age and social status, 
interested in engaging themselves in information sharing joyful exercises. In each FGD, 6-12 
participants discussed about the issues initiated and prompted by the moderator.  
 
Data Collection Methods 
In this research I used four survey instruments: 1) Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), 2) Focus 
Group Discussion (FGD), 3) Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) and 4) Household 
Questionnaire. Data collection methods are combination of both qualitative (instrument 1 and 2) 
and quantitative (instrument 3 and 4) methods. Qualitative components are designed to listen and 
learn from group of poor and non-poor rural people. Quantitative components are mainly 
household survey using semi structured questionnaire and poverty scorecard.  
 
1) Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): PRA is a short cut method of collecting data quickly and 
accurately by learning from and with respondents. The role of the researchers is to facilitate rural 
people in collecting, presenting and analysing information owned and shared by them. 
Researchers are usually ignorant of the local condition, environment and knowledge and thus 
they are outsiders and learners. Respondents, on the other hand, are well aware of the local situation, 
knowledge and experience and they therefore are insiders and preceptors. In PRA outsiders establish 
rapport, facilitate methods, hand over the stick and then watch and listen to insiders who use 
map, model, and diagram to plan, discus and evaluate their livelihood and environment. PRA 
contains various exercises such as Transects, Participatory Mapping, Seasonal Calendars, Venn 
Diagrams, Flow Charts, Mobility Map, and Timelines. In this study, PRA includes following 
exercises:  
 
a) Village transects – Research team met village leaders and senior persons to obtain general 
overview of the economy, history and geography of the village. They chose a person who led the 
team for an observatory walk through the residential area of the village. These transects provided 
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an ‘objective’ map that identifies village infrastructure including housing, drainage and sanitation 
and economic activities such as livestock management, rural trades and crafts. 
 
b) Social mapping – Villagers were asked to prepare ‘social map’ of the village which includes 
topology of the village in social and economic terms, and inventory of village resources such as 
school, wells, hand pumps, community centres, religious centre, MFI groups, social capital etc. It 
identifies social networks and their uses in confronting social crises. Social maps also reveal the 
division of the village in poverty scale.  
 
c) Seasonal calendar – In this exercise, villagers have drawn trends in their main economic 
activities, problems and opportunities throughout the year. It is used in assessing seasonal 
variation in crop production, livelihood, health and nutrition in order to identify frequency and 
magnitude of difficulties and vulnerability they face. 
 
d) Wealth ranking – In this exercise villagers were asked to rank their households on the basis of 
relative wealth and level of poverty. Wealth ranking exercise provides valuable information on 
local views of wealth characteristics and perceptions in economic wellbeing in terms of their own 
poverty and vulnerability scale. 
 
e) Mobility map – In a mobility map respondents explore movement pattern of individual, group 
or community searching for services, facilities and livelihood opportunities. In this exercise 
villagers were asked to draw a map of economic activities with symbols and explain in details 
such as purpose, distance, mode of transportation, importance and frequency of visits. Male and 
female mobility map are done separately to capture the gender difference in these activities.  
 
f) Pairwise ranking – Pairwise ranking is a method of comparing pair of elements such as 
problems, potentials and needs. In this study, the research team let people recognise their need 
for financial instruments such as different types of microcredit and microsavings. They then put 
the items in row and column to compare each pair and finally enter the preferred item in the 
relevant grid. Client’s preference score is drawn on frequency of the items in the grid. 
 
 
2) Focus Group Discussion (FGD): FGD gathers information from a group of people directly 
affected by an issue or exclusively involved in a programme. In this research there were five focus 
groups in each village: Three poverty groups (ultra-poor, poor and non-poor), three service 
provider groups (MFI fieldworkers) and one other service provider group (village doctor, local 
government member, money lenders). Main topics in this FGD are types of risks and crises, 
coping strategies, perceptions and preferences about the microfinancial instruments for 
accumulating assets and managing risks. Participants also discussed about the role of MFIs in 
their lives, identify any shortcomings in MFI services particularly microsavings. In this FGD, 
both male and female participants are allowed to discuss on gender issues in microsavings and 
coping capacities. 
 
3) Progress out of Poverty (PPI) Scorecard: PPI Scorecard, developed by Chen and Mark (2009) 
for Grameen Foundation, is a quick and cost effective poverty assessment tool for MFIs and 
NGOs that measures and tracks economic poverty levels of the clients (Grameen, 2008). It is 
easy to administer, only five minutes needed to conduct interview, tally the scores and compute 
the poverty likelihood in the field using paper, pencil and calculator. PPI constitutes a scorecard 
with 10 easily observable, quick to ask and readily answerable questions which have the close link 
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with the poverty status. For example, easily verifiable ‘roofing material’ is used instead of 
unobservable ‘value of the house’. Final PPI score is the summation of response values from 
each question. Score ranges from 0 meaning the most likely poor to 100 or most likely above the 
poverty line. Poverty likelihood is estimated through a lookup table constructed on the basis of 
national poverty line and international benchmark adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). In 
this table total score from scorecard gives corresponding poverty likelihood of a household at a 
point in time or over time.   
 
4) Household Questionnaire: Household questionnaire is designed to capture demographic, 
financial and social information including education, health, income and expenditure, loans and 
savings, crises coping strategies. After the qualitative data collection is complete, I analysed 
preliminary results to identify issues appropriate for follow-up in the household survey. This 
follow-up was required to maintain the sequence of the Q-squared approach in qual-quant order 
such that one method can clarify and enrich the result of the other. The Questionnaire consists 
of ‘Closed’ set of questions which are easy to understand and quick to answer at all literacy level. 
It is also easy to code and simple to create database for further analysis compared to ‘Open’ set. 
 
Construct of Survey Instruments: Key constructs for PRA in this survey are participatory 
mapping, seasonal calendars, and wealth ranking which involve voluntary and joyful participation 
of respondents. Researcher’s role here is to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and information of 
local conditions. Main constructs for FGD are types of crises facing the rural households and 
their coping strategies, perceptions and preferences of rural people about uses of microfinance in 
accumulating assets and managing risks. Key constructs for survey Questionnaire are income and 
expenditure, loans and savings, types of risks and crises, resilience and coping capacities of the 
poor. It also contains demographic data such as gender, age, marital status, occupation etc. 
Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) includes 10 easily verifiable questions that have close link 
with poverty status.  
 
PRA provides data on social structure, ethnography, power structure, poverty map, and financial 
portfolio of residents in a village. It supplies information that identifies focus poverty groups for 
the FGD. Discussions in FGD include types of risks and crises facing the rural poor, perceptions 
and preferences of rural poor about microfinance and their utilisation in coping with crises. 
Survey Questionnaire and PPI provide quantitative information on household demography and 
socioeconomic activities of rural people. Although PRA and FGDs are respondent driven 
exercises, facilitators need to limit the flow of outcome within the scope of the study. These 
exercises are designed in such a way that they provide information that cross check the 
information gathered by household questionnaires and PPI. This also mitigates the problem of 
missing or unavailable data.  
 
 
Survey Administration 
 
Survey Process: The survey was held in two villages in northeast Bangladesh during February to 
April 2013. Research team for the survey comprises three members: two data collectors and a 
principal investigator. As a principal investigator I was responsible for facilitating the PRA and 
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FGDs while data collectors assisted me in taking field notes, operating digital recorder and 
transcribing PRA exercises into newsprint. They also assisted respondents to fill up questionnaire 
as many of the respondents were not able to read and write properly. A pilot survey was done 
with 10 households before the data collection was started in February 2013. This has been useful 
in reshaping the survey questionnaire and reorganising PRA and FGD tools. Survey 
questionnaire, FGD prompt card and PPI score card have been developed before the start of the 
survey. These documents were printed in sufficient numbers keeping some spare copies in case 
of spoils. PRA materials were taken from village resources such as seeds, tree leaves, stones, 
pebbles, flowers etc. Data collectors were provided with paper and pencil, sharpener, eraser, 
ruler, writing pad, tape recorder, torch light and above all daily allowance. Training was organized 
for data collectors to minimise any information gap, overall low response and inconsistency in 
data collection process. Before we start with survey questionnaire we organised PRA exercises, 
facilitated FGDs and completed PPI score cards. Sample households were selected at random 
from the household groups stratified by PRA wealth ranking exercises. We finally distributed 
questionnaires to those households and sit with respondents face to face to assist him or her 
understanding the relevant questions. 
 
Follow up: There was a follow up mechanism in the survey that minimises the risk of missing or 
unavailable data. Filled up questionnaires were carefully investigated to spot any missing or 
irrelevant data and respective households were revisited if necessary. Sometimes this problem 
arises when respondents incorrectly understand some specific questions or data collectors are not 
well aware of specific constructs of the questionnaire. To minimise the impact of these problems 
extra time were allocated to particular households. Data collectors were given proper training for 
thorough understanding of the questionnaire and efficient conversation with respondents. In case 
of any household unwilling to respond, the questionnaire was supplied to an extra household 
selected in the process of random sampling. In order to avoid any bias or time pressure this 
selection was held ex ante i.e. at the time of initial random selection and not ex post i.e. after the 
situation arose. 
 
Pre-analysis Transcripts: After the data collection and follow up process was over, filled up 
questionnaires have been organised for coding, cleaning and data processing. Database has been 
created using the research package called Eviews. PRA exercises were transcribed in the 
newsprint just after respondents have finished the description of their drawings. Their 
explanations were recorded in the digital recorder and field notes of the data collectors. 
Participant’s narration in Focus Group Discussion (FGD) has also been recorded in digital 
recorder and field notes. Their discussions have been transcribed carefully into written form for 
further analysis.  
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
In this research I use mixed method (known as Q-squared approach) combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to allow for triangulation in data analysis. Mixed approach ensures validity 
or appropriateness of the data to actual conditions through qualitative analysis. It also takes care 
of reliability of the data through quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis utilises qualitative data 
collection methods such as PRA and FGD while quantitative method uses semi-structured 
questionnaire and Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI). PRA are used for topology of study area 
and random selection of respondents for survey and focus group. PPI are used for assessing the 
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poverty likelihood of the respondents. PRA, FGD and survey questionnaire together explore 
respondent’s perception, preferences and attitude towards microsavings and its effectiveness in 
risk management strategies. These will generate information related to impact of microsavings on 
lives of rural poor. Statistical package, SPSS will be used for descriptive statistics on informal and 
formal coping mechanisms and insurance role of microsavings against shocks. A regression 
analysis will involve in quantifying demand for and impact of savings services for the poor using 
econometric research package like Eviews or Microfit. Logistic regression model may be used to 
find out the relationship poverty likelihood and use of microsavings in addressing socioeconomic 
shocks facing rural poor. Qualitative and quantitative analysis together will cross check the 
outcome of this study. 
 
 
FURTHER AGENDA 
 
Fieldwork was held in two villages in northeast Bangladesh during February – April, 2013. The 
survey includes qualitative instruments such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Focus 
Group Discussion (FGD) and Quantitative instruments such as Progress out of Poverty Index 
(PPI) and Household Questionnaire (HQ). I have following analysis plan in next few months 
before starting full-fledged thesis write-up. 1) In-depth understanding of rural people’s analysis of 
PRA and FGD. 2) Measurement of vulnerability using the following equations: Vht = Pr(Ch,t+1 ≤ 
z) where Vht = vulnerability level of a household h, at time t, Ch,t+1 = household’s per-capita 
consumption level at time t+1, z = consumption poverty line and Pr is probability that the 
household will fall below poverty at time t +1, and 3) Logit/Probit regression of vulnerability on 
its correlates. 
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Publication news from UEL PhD Alumni and Alumnae: 
 
2012-2013 
 
 
a) Books and Edited Collections 
 
 
 
Gender and Cosmopolitanism in Europe: A Feminist Perspective 
by Ulrike M. Vieten, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2012 
 
 
The Author explores the highly contested 
concept of cosmpolitanism in this recent book. 
Through an indepth engagement with the work 
of key cosmopolitanism thinkers including Jürgen 
Habermas and Homi Bhabha, and considering 
feminist criticisms from Chantal Mouffe, Vieten 
provides an an engaging but challenging read. 
 
Review: 
 
This book combines a feminist critique of 
contemporary and prominent approaches to 
cosmopolitanism with an analysis of historical 
cosmopolitanism and the manner in which 
gendered symbolic boundaries of national 
political communities in Britain and Germany are 
drawn. Exploring the work of prominent scholars 
including Held, Habermas, Beck, and Bhabha, it 
attempts to deliver a timely intervention into 
current debates on globalization, Europeanization 
and social processes of transformation in and 
beyond specific national societies. (Joe Laking). 
 
 
 
 
Dr Ulrike Vieten received her PhD in 2008 for the thesis, Situated Cosmopolitanisms: 
the notion of the Other in discourses on cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany, the 
University of East London (UEL), Director of Studies, Prof. Nira Yuval-Davis 
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Oral History in the Visual Arts 
Edited by Linda Sandino and Mathew Partington, 2013 
 
 
 
Interviews are becoming an increasingly 
dominant research method in art, craft, 
design, fashion and textile history. This 
groundbreaking text demonstrates how 
artists, writers and historians deploy 
interviews as creative practice, as 
'history', and as a means to insights into 
the micro-practices of arts production 
and identity that contribute to questions 
of 'voice', authenticity, and authorship. 
Through a wide range of case studies 
from international scholars and 
practitioners across a variety of fields, 
the volume maps how oral history 
interviews contribute to a relational 
practice that is creative, rigorous and 
ethically grounded. Oral History in the 
Visual Arts is essential reading for 
students, researchers and practitioners 
across the visual arts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Linda Sandino received her PhD in 2010 for the thesis ‘Life History Narratives 
in the applied arts’ the University of East London (UEL), Director of Studies, Prof. 
Molly Andrews 
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Undutiful Daughters:  
New Directions in Feminist Thought and Practice.  
 
Edited by Henriette Gunkel, Chrysanthi Nigianni and Fanny Söderbäck, 2012 
 
 
This exciting collection offers a range of 
perspectives from some of the most prominent 
feminist voices of our time, including Rosi 
Braidotti, Judith Butler, Claire Colebrook, 
Elizabeth Grosz, and Jack Halberstam. 
Employing experimental modes of thinking and 
writing, the contributors remain faithful to the 
feminist tradition of subversion and resistance, 
while refusing to submit to its political tradition 
of a loving sisterhood or dutiful daughterhood. 
Through productive disagreement and 
cognitive dissonance, the essays presented here 
reflect the specific circumstances of our 
present, and attempt to dream and envision 
possible alternatives for the future. The volume 
thus invites us to think of the becoming of 
feminism itself, and the possibilities of future 
feminisms-to-come. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Henriette Gunkel received her PhD in 2010 for the thesis: The cultural politics of 
female same-sex intimacy in post-apartheid South Africa, the University of East London 
(UEL), Director of Studies, Prof. Nira Yuval-Davis 
 
Dr Chrysanthi Nigianni received her PhD in 2009 for the thesis ‘Queer: 
corporealising the Other’, the University of East London (UEL), Director of 
Studies, Dr Merl Storr. 
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Adoption, Family and the Paradox of Origins:  
A Foucauldian History 
By Sally Sales, 2012 
 
Applying Foucauldian methodology, this book 
explores why the practice of keeping adopted 
children in touch with their kinship origins is 
still so questioned in contemporary adoption 
work. 
 
It is now over 20 years since 'open adoption' 
was first introduced, but it remains a 
controversial and contested part of social 
work practice. This innovative and far ranging 
book sets out to understand why the practice 
of keeping adopted children in touch with 
their kinship origins is still so questioned in 
contemporary adoption work.  
 
Written by an experienced practitioner in the 
field, this book applies, for the first time, 
Foucauldian methodology to analyze and 
understand adoption social work, making 
it essential reading for a wide audience in the 
social sciences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Sally Sales received her PhD in 2009 for the thesis, Paradoxes of adoption, the 
University of East London (UEL), Director of Studies, Prof. Maria Tamboukou. 
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b) Articles and Chapters in Books 
 
 
Esin, Cigdem and Squire, Corinne. (2013). ‘Visual autobiographies in East London: Narratives of 
still images, interpersonal exchanges, and intrapersonal dialogues’ Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research. 
 
Ghorashi Halleh and Vieten Urlike M. (2013). Female narratives of “new” citizens belonging(s) 
and identities in Europe: case studies from the Netherlands and Britain. Identities: Global 
Studies in Culture and Power, 1(1), 1-17 
 
Gunkel, Henriette (2012). “Spiegelungen von color bars?  
Keller in Südafrika”. In: Bilder von Helen Keller. Ulrike Bergermann (ed.).  
b_books, Berlin (Reihe: PolyPen). 
 
Haschemi Yekani, Elahe and Henriette Gunkel (2012). “(Sich) Fortbewegen”.  
In: What Can a Body Do? Praktiken und Figurationen des Körpers in den  
Kulturwissenschaften. Netzwerk Körper (ed.). Frankfurt am Main/New York:  
Campus, 2012. Praktiken 57-69. 
 
Gunkel, Henriette and Olaf Stieglitz (2012). “Praxis Sex Machen/Sex Haben”.  
In: What Can a Body Do? Praktiken und Figurationen des Körpers in den 
8585ulturwissenschaften. Ed. Netzwerk Körper. Frankfurt am Main/New York:  
Campus, 2012. Praktiken 97-110. 
 
Gunkel, Henriette (2012). “Queer Times Indeed? Südafrikas Reaktionen auf  
die mediale Inszenierung der 800Meter Läuferin Caster Semenya”. In:  
Feministische Studien 1/2012, 44-52. 
 
Loehrer, Gudrun, 2012. Network body, ed What Can a Body Do? practices and figurations of the 
body in cultural studies. Frankfurt / New York: Campus.  
 
Newlands Maxine. 2013 Reclaiming the media: technology, tactics and subversion. In: Technology, Society 
and Inequality: new horizons and contested futures. Digital Formations, 87. Peter Lang 
Publishing, New York, USA, pp. 155-166 
 
Newlands Maxine. 2012. Carbon trading in the city of undoing. In: London After Recession: a 
fictitious capital?. Design and the Built Environment. Ashgate Publishing, Oxford, UK, pp. 
199-212 
 
Newlands Maxine. 2012. Debunking disability: media discourse and the Paralympic Games. In: Heroes or 
Zeros: the medias perceptions of Paralympic sport. Sport and Society. Common Ground 
Publishing, Illinois, USA, pp. 209-224 
 
Nigianni, Chrysanthi. 2013. Chantal Akerman’s Là-bas: The Suspended Image and the Politics of 
Anti-Messianism. Senses of Cinema. 67. 
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Squire, Corinne, Esin, Cigdem and Burman, Erika. 2013. 'You Are Here': Visual Autobiographies, 
Cultural-Spatial Positioning, and Resources for Urban Living’. Sociological Research Online, 18(3) 
1. 
 
Taylor, Helen. 2013.'Refugees, the State and the Concept of Home', Refugee Survey Quarterly 
(2013) 32 (2): 130-152. 
 
Taylor , Helen. 2013. "'You Don't Believe Me?': Truth and Testimony in Cypriot Refugee 
Narratives." in Adler & Leydesdorff (eds) Tapestry of Memory: Evidence and Testimony in 
Life-Story Narratives.  
 
Zaman, Tahir. 2012. ‘Jockeying for position in the humanitarian field: Iraqi refugees and 
faith-based organisations in Damascus’. Disasters 
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